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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
NEW SECURE SOLUTIONS FOR PRIVACY AND ACCESS CONTROL IN
HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE
In the current digital age, almost every healthcare organization (HCO) has moved
from storing patient health records on paper to storing them electronically. Health
Information Exchange (HIE) is the ability to share (or transfer) patients’ health
information between di↵erent HCOs while maintaining national security standards
like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996. Over
the past few years, research has been conducted to develop privacy and access control
frameworks for HIE systems. The goal of this dissertation is to address the privacy
and access control concerns by building practical and e cient HIE frameworks to
secure the sharing of patients’ health information.
The first solution allows secure HIE among di↵erent healthcare providers while
focusing primarily on the privacy of patients’ information. It allows patients to au-
thorize a certain type of health information to be retrieved, which helps prevent any
unintentional leakage of information. The privacy solution also provides healthcare
providers with the capability of mutual authentication and patient authentication.
It also ensures the integrity and auditability of health information being exchanged.
The security and performance study for the first protocol shows that it is e cient for
the purpose of HIE and o↵ers a high level of security for such exchanges.
The second framework presents a new cloud-based protocol for access control to
facilitate HIE across di↵erent HCOs, employing a trapdoor hash-based proxy signa-
ture in a novel manner to enable secure (authenticated and authorized) on-demand
access to patient records. The proposed proxy signature-based scheme provides an
explicit mechanism for patients to authorize the sharing of specific medical informa-
tion with specific HCOs, which helps prevent any undesired or unintentional leakage
of health information. The scheme also ensures that such authorizations are authentic
with respect to both the HCOs and the patient. Moreover, the use of proxy signa-
tures simplifies security auditing and the ability to obtain support for investigations
by providing non-repudiation. Formal definitions, security specifications, and a de-
tailed theoretical analysis, including correctness, security, and performance of both
frameworks are provided which demonstrate the improvements upon other existing
HIE systems.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
In order to promote widespread adoption and meaningful use of Health Informa-
tion Technology (HIT), the US federal government provided financial incentives to
healthcare providers under the 2009 Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. The HITECH supports the development of electronic
health information management systems and secure health information exchange.
1.1 Health Information Exchange
Health Information Exchange (HIE) refers to the electronic transmission of health
care data among facilities and professionals within a particular community, area,
or hospital. In other words, HIE is the ability to appropriately access and securely
share patients’ health information between di↵erent healthcare organizations (HCOs)
according to national standards. It involves healthcare and government institutions,
health information organizations, and qualified health care providers. The purpose of
HIE development is to improve healthcare delivery by o↵ering reliable and secure ways
to access and retrieve health information among diverse systems. It is an inherent
part of the health information technology infrastructure as it aims to improve data
gathering and medical care.
While now-a-days most medical information is still gathered through written
records and is stored in paper form, HIE managed to develop three main methods
to innovate current healthcare procedures. These methods are defined as: consumer-
1
mediated exchange, directed exchange, and query-based exchange [4]. Consumer-
mediated exchange is done by providing patients with access to their own electronic
records, thus allowing them to track their health conditions, determine whether there
is erroneous billing or medical data, and update their self-reports. Directed exchange
is conducted when a healthcare organization transfers such vital information as lab
test results and medication dosage to other specialists involved in the care of the
same patient. Query-based exchange usually occurs in unplanned medical care when
a healthcare organization needs the previous health records of a new patient. This is
done by requesting access to these records through the HIE system.
A patient’s medical records should follow him or her wherever and whenever
needed, despite barriers that may occur due to the involvement of multiple facil-
ities in di↵erent geographic areas. Thus, current HIE governance should be done
through e↵ective collaboration between entities while considering implementation
costs. Unfortunately, not all facilities are able to a↵ord electronic exchange, and
this is why this issue should be further addressed by both reducing the overall cost
of HIE and searching for substantial financial support for the development of the
system [5]. Furthermore, governance policies and models should be introduced and
constantly updated to e ciently manage the system and solve arising issues. Finally,
since health-related information is too private to be retrieved by non-professionals,
HIE relies on secure data transfer among various electronic systems [6]. This is why
HIE should be done with regards to privacy policies, strictly limiting the access to
patients’ records in order to prevent any outsider from gaining unauthorized access to
the system. The information should be exchanged among entities without leaking out
2
of the system, which may occur because of the faults of the system itself or liability
issues.
1.2 Health Information Exchange Concerns
Privacy and security management already create problems in today’s HIE. Specif-
ically, there are three main issues which need to be addressed. The first problem
occurs when insiders of the system abuse their access rights [7]. This usually happens
when health care providers share medical records of their patients with unauthorized
individuals, either out of irresponsibility, for personal reasons, or in exchange for some
kind of gain. For instance, medical records of celebrities and politicians frequently
leak out of HIE system into the media. The second problem concerns unauthorized
insiders, who may have access to the system itself but not to the records [8]. For in-
stance, hospital employees who do not provide direct patient care or former employees
who have not yet been electronically restricted from data retrieval. The former group
can use the existing access to hack the private informational database while the latter
may decide to seek vengeance on their former employers by undermining HIE secu-
rity. The third problem arises when an unauthorized intruder attempts to enter the
system either by attacking it directly or by pretending to be part of the health care
team [9]. Either way, this problem has already shown itself as most harmful because
outside intruders risk more than the insiders, and thus they tend to have ambitious
plans that are worth their risk. Therefore, it is evident that HIE needs to address the
problem of privacy and security before further development and application in health
care.
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As the healthcare industry starts relying more heavily on electronic storage of
health records, the need to secure such records has become essential. As shown in
Figure 1.1, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) developed two rules to satisfy the requirements of the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA): the privacy rule and the security
rule.
Figure 1.1: HIPAA Rules
The privacy rule [10] declares a set of standards, which describe how healthcare
providers keep, store, protect, and share patients’ health information. The HIPAA
security rule [11] defines security standards to protect the privacy of individuals’
electronic Protected Health Information (e-PHI). It specifically mentions the require-
ments of ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all e-PHI created,
received, maintained or transmitted. It also requires the identification and protection
of e-PHI against anticipated threats to the security or integrity of the information.
4
An Electronic Health Record (EHR) refers to a patient’s paper chart stored in a
digital format. EHRs are increasingly becoming the way of storing information about
patients (like medication, allergies, laboratory test results, immunization statuses,
vital signs, radiology images, personal statistics like age, weight, and billing infor-
mation). EHRs encompass patient’s medical and treatment histories. Such records
are usually stored locally within a certain infrastructure, e.g., at medical institu-
tions, and are only accessible from within the infrastructure. To increase e ciency
in medical services and to provide complete and accurate medical information, inter-
institutional EHRs are more and more used to accumulate and keep information on
patients. EHRs instantly and securely make information to authorized users only in
order to automate and streamline providers’ workflow [12]. In addition, EHRs facili-
tate medical decision-making concerning patients’ care by allowing access to evidence
based tools. EHR systems are developed to increase the e ciency of medical services
and to provide complete and accurate medical information on patients. The U.S.
Government is encouraging healthcare providers to deploy EHR systems by provid-
ing “EHR Incentive Programs” [13].
1.3 Electronic Health Records Benefits
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are useful to both providers and patients. The
benefits associated with EHRs include:
Improved health care quality and accessibility: EHRs improve the quality
and ease of accessibility of health care for both the patients and providers. The
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electronic system allows providers to gain quick access to the records of patients from
inpatient and remote locations for easy coordination and e ciency of health care [14].
Also, it supports improved decision making, clinical alerts, medical information, and
reminders. Furthermore, it provides tools for improving performance through real-
time quality reporting, o↵ers intelligible and comprehensive documentation for precise
billing and coding and links with other EHRs, registries, and laboratories. Finally, it
supports more steadfast and safer prescription of medication (electronic prescribing).
For the patients, it reduces the repetitive process of filling out forms at each o ce they
visit, provides convenient electronic prescriptions which are sent to the pharmacies
directly, o↵ers online patient portals to enable them to interact with the providers
and provides the patients with electronic referrals for easier access to continued care
with providers and specialists [15].
Increased patient’s participation: Collaboration in informed decision making
can be facilitated when patients and providers share access to electronic health in-
formation. Patient participation is enhanced through creation of an avenue for com-
munication between providers and patients [16]. Personal health record applications
can be provided to patients to enable them maintain and manage their own health
information.
Enhanced care management: EHRs has the ability to integrate and organize the
health information of patients in order to enable its immediate dissemination among
all the authorized providers involved in patient care. Every provider has access to
up-to-date and accurate information about each patient to improve care quality [17].
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Value added diagnostics and patient results: Complete and accurate informa-
tion enables the providers to enhance patient medical care. EHRs improve disease
diagnostic abilities and minimize medical errors. This leads to enhanced patient re-
sults and improved patient safety [18]. Risk management can be improved through
providing clinical reminders and alerts to providers.
Improved medical management through increased practice e ciencies and
cost savings: This is made possible through enhanced communication with all other
providers such as labs, technicians, and health plans by making patient information
available anywhere. Amount of time spent on paperwork is reduced, leading to re-
duced costs [19]. Paperwork tasks can be streamlined to increase e ciencies and
which in turn further reduces time and monetary costs. Introduction of electronic
prescribing replaces paper prescriptions. E-prescribing lowers costs and improves
health care. EHRs reduce the duplication of testing by providing a central place for
the storage of patient information.
1.4 Electronic Health Records Standards
Standards in representing EHRs are important in that they provide a common lan-
guage and a set of anticipations to enable interoperability among systems and devices.
The standards for EHRs are aimed at increased coordination of care. There are groups
formed to harmonize the challenges faced by shared Electronic Health Record sys-
tems [15]. The groups include: HL7 [20] [21] [22], which is responsible for developing a
standard for the clinical document architecture and templates, openEHR [23], which
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deals with the technical activities like architecture, implementation projects, and
clinical activities like archetypes, standard activities, and CEN (a standardization
committee for Europe dealing with EHR communication standards). The following
standards derived from the above groups should be observed when presenting Elec-
tronic Health Record systems:
1. EHRs should have the ability to generate, send, obtain and present standardized
evolution of care documents.
2. EHRs should have the ability to o↵er electronic prescription, reconciliation be-
tween patients’ past and present medical information, incorporation of labora-
tory test outcomes, and creation of patients’ care summaries.
3. EHRs should be capable of working with standardized documents, which is
referred to as interoperability.
4. EHRs must have the ability to use the consolidated clinical document architec-
ture (CCDA) for the transfer of care documents summaries.
1.5 Health Information Exchange Architectures
Since the role of HIE is to provide care facilities with the ability to circulate EHRs
among varied medical information systems, HIE systems can have federated, central-
ized, or hybrid architectures. The federated structure requires local patient informa-
tion storage at each healthcare organization to ensure a higher level of data security
and privacy. If an outside organization wants to access patient information, it must
8
retrieve it from the HCO holding the information. In addition, to access the infor-
mation the entity must be a member of an association, and at the same time, must
commit itself to sharing the information with other members of the network. The
participants in this model are often held responsible for ensuring that information is
accessed by the authorized members only.
The centralized HIE system, also referred to as the consolidated model, involves
storing all health information in a single data repository or warehouse (e.g., cloud).
Each member of the centralized HIE system is expected to transmit patients’ health
information to the remote repository, where the information is securely stored [24].
The health information is continuously updated through interfaces connected directly
to each healthcare organization’s information repository in order to improve security
and confidentiality. These interfaces usually allow for unaltered patient information
flow to the central authority. Whenever a member organization requests access, it is
subjected to pre-defined unique patient identifiers before being authorized.
The hybrid HIE system combines the elements of centralized and federated sys-
tems. This system holds significant record identifiers along with requests for patient
data distributed across a network. To ensure security and privacy, access to the infor-
mation is often subject to stern measures. As such, a record locator key is habitually
used not only to gather health information but also to transfer it to the healthcare
organization. The system uses algorithms within the network applications to ensure
positive trends in gathering the patient information stored in the remote repository.
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1.6 Problem Statement
This section presents a case study of the problem we are considering. HOMEBASE
is a provider of medical services and is the medical home for George. FARAWAY is
a provider of medical services in another community. George is traveling and finds
that he must seek services at the FARAWAY clinic.
1. FARAWAY calls and asks the health information management (HIM) depart-
ment at HOMEBASE for George’s summary clinical record.
2. The HOMEBASE’s HIM department asks the requesting physician at FAR-
AWAY about George to confirm his patient identity and consults the national
provider database (or another resource that the relying party trusts) to verify
that FARAWAY is a valid provider of services.
3. The HOMEBASE’s HIM department then calls the FARAWAY management
services organization (MSO) department to verify that the requesting physi-
cian actually works at the FARAWAY clinic and verifies the fax number of
FARAWAY.
4. Having assured that the request is legitimate (established trust), the HOME-
BASE’s HIM department faxes the records requested by FARAWAY.
To clarify the problems and drawbacks of the current HIE process, we present a
scenario of the problem we are considering, as shown in Figure 1.2.
Tim lived in two states before moving to California. In the first state, Virginia,
Tim had a terrible accident when he was 25 years old and received a blood transfu-
10
Figure 1.2: Current Health Information Exchange Process
sion at HCO1. Healthcare organization HCO1 uses EHR system “S1”. Tim visited
HCO1 for various treatments while he was living in Virginia. Tim then moved to
Minnesota and discovered that he had a liver problem. After being seen several times
at healthcare organization HCO2 in Minnesota and doing blood work, Tim’s physi-
cian informed him that he needed a liver transplant. Healthcare organization HCO2
uses EHR system “S2”. Tim received a successful liver transplant at HCO2 when
he was 45 years old. He continued his care at HCO2 for several years to follow-up
on the transplant surgery. He was also seen by physicians from other specialities
unrelated to the transplant surgery. Tim considers his visits to the other speciality
physicians confidential and he does not want anyone, including other physicians in
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HCO2 and his family members, to know about the visits. The EHR system in HCO2
automatically prevents physicians from viewing health information unrelated to their
area of expertise.
Now, Tim is visiting California and had an accident. He is admitted to organi-
zation HCO3 which wants to collect all medical history to have clear and accurate
health information before starting a treatment plan. Tim’s medical history includes
all treatments, surgeries, x-rays, blood work, and allergies. Healthcare provider HCO3
uses EHR system “S3”. The typical process to retrieve Tim’s health information from
HCO1 and HCO2 is to obtain a written consent, signed by Tim, to release his health
information stored at both HCO1 and HCO2. The written consent is a general form
that does not specify which health information is being requested. HCO3 has to
fax the signed written consent to HCO1 and HCO2 and wait for the reply to be
faxed back. The process may also include phone calls between involved parties to
authenticate the initiating healthcare provider.
This process of health information retrieval from several healthcare organizations
has three main drawbacks. First, even if the requesting healthcare provider and the
provider holding requested medical information are operating normally, the patient
must wait until the medical information is received back.
Second, the requesting healthcare provider could face a huge delay in getting the
response back if there exists a time di↵erence between communicating healthcare
providers or if the healthcare provider holding requested medical information is not
operating during the time of request. In this case, a further appointment may need
to be arranged when all medical information is gathered and available.
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Lastly, the signed written consent does not specify which medical information
should be retrieved. Subsequently, disclosure of health information that the patient
did not want to share with the requesting healthcare provider is more likely to oc-
cur. Also, the consent can be used to retrieve health information from healthcare
organizations other than those specified by the patient.
There is a range of high-level consent models a Health Information Exchange
might choose to implement [25]. These include no consent, opt-in, opt-in with limi-
tations, opt-out, and opt-out with exceptions [26]. The no consent usually does not
necessitate any form of agreement on the patient’s part to take part in the HIE. The
opt-out model tends to allow for a prearranged information set to be included by
design in the HIE. However, patients have the right to restrict or deny access to their
information in the HIE system. The opt-out with exceptions model allows personal
health information to be available in a HIE system. However, it provides the patient
with the freedom to exclude information from an exchange in a selective manner.
The patient is also allowed to limit information exchange for certain uses. The opt-in
model necessitates that patients make their desires known about the exposure of their
information within an exchange. The opt-in with restriction model requires the pa-
tients to specify the data and amount of information to be availed in the HIE system.
To automate HIE, HCOs must have common terms and attribute values that would
govern the exchange and maintain trust requirements.
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1.7 Motivation
A healthcare system breach refers to an impermissible security occurrence where data
that is sensitive, confidential, or protected is accessed, altered, or used by an unau-
thorized person. Breaches are caused by theft, disclosure or unauthorized access, loss,
improper disclosure or hacking into the electronic health record systems. Employees
of an organization pose the greatest threat to information security. Adequate secu-
rity measures and mechanisms should be enforced to safeguard information against
breaches [15]. When a breach occurs, the a↵ected individuals should be notified. Also,
internal actions should be taken to minimize the damage like corrective activities and
measures to safeguard against recurrence. There has been a gradual increasing trend
of breaches into healthcare systems. The rise in the number of incidents is attributed
to the advancements in technology. Hackers are using more sophisticated technologies
to attack systems. Also, the health sector is more vulnerable to attacks. Security
controls in the health sector are not fully enforced.
Moreover, this new digital environment is more vulnerable to cyber criminal ex-
ploits. The availability and even distribution of healthcare associated cybercrime is a
concern and an emerging threat to healthcare systems [27]. Major breaches have oc-
cured in organizations like Anthem, CareFirst, Premera and UCLA Health systems.
As a result, a total of 143 million patient records were exploited by cyber-attacks,
which amounted to 45% of the American population [28]. A cyber security assess-
ment by the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) in
2015 indicates that in the last 12 months, 64% of medical centers had been exposed to
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external cyber-attacks [29]. Bloomer News claimed that in the previous 2 years, of all
healthcare providers, 90% have been attacked [30]. Furthermore, most data breaches
occur in healthcare and medical industries as compared to financial, governmental, or
educational sectors [31]. In 2014, the healthcare and medical sectors were identified
to have been victims of 46% of the described breaches [29].
The Saint Joseph Health System in Texas su↵ered a security breach in 2014 [32] [33].
A server was hacked and 405,000 records of both past and current patients, employ-
ees, and beneficiaries to the employees were compromised. Medical information of
patients’ and employees’ bank account data were accessed without authorization.
Rural Illinois hospital was attacked in 2014 [34]. The hospital received an email
from an unknown sender containing patient names, addresses Social Security numbers
and birth dates. The sender demanded a substantial payment and threatened that if
the hospital failed to pay, the information of all the patients would be made public.
As a result, the private health records of 12,621 persons were compromised [34].
Boston-based Massachusetts General Hospital su↵ered a data breach when em-
ployees replied to a phishing email, believing it was legitimate, providing protected
health information in 2014 [35]. As a result, 3,300 patients were a↵ected and notified
by the hospital for the security compromise of their health information.
The Saint Vincent health system in Indianapolis faced a breach in 2014 [36]. Social
Security numbers and clinical data for medical group patients were compromised.
The breach occurred through an email phishing event. 760 patients were a↵ected
and notified. Employees’ network usernames and passwords were compromised. The
hospital was also faced by other two breaches which involved the theft of unencrypted
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laptops containing medical records for 2,341 patients. The breach corrupted the
health records for all involved patients.
In April 2015, OhioHealth based in Columbus, Ohio discovered that an unen-
crypted flash drive containing 1000 sensitive health information records for patients
was missing and notified the patients of a breach [37] [38]. The missing flash drive
could have been a theft by one of the employees for financial gain.
In July 2015, University Hospitals Elyria Medical Center su↵ered a data breach.
An employee accessed unauthorized medical records for patients [39] [40]. The breach
a↵ected 297 patients. The employee was fired and the a↵ected patients notified.
Texas Children’s Clinics faced a data breach in October 2015 [41] [42]. An em-
ployee took business documents home from the o ce. The employee gained unautho-
rized access to patient health records, took screenshots, and showed them to a third
party. The employee was fired immediately. 16,000 patient records were a↵ected.
Patients’ names, birth dates, diagnostic information, and treatment information were
compromised.
In February 2016, The Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Southern Cal-
ifornia was targeted by a ransomware attack [43] [44] [45]. The hospital’s network
was hacked and disabled, rendering all computers useless. The computer network
data was encrypted and held hostage. To restore their systems and administrative
functions, the hospital had to pay the hackers $17,000 for the decryption key.
Whereas the financial and retail sectors have had su cient time to develop reli-
able security standards, the recent transition to EHRs has placed healthcare security
behind the security of other industries [46]. Health information contains details like
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prescriptions for controlled substances which makes it more valuable to hackers than
credit card numbers [47]. The FBI indicates that cyber criminals sell partial medical
information at a rate of $50 per record on the black market, compared to $1 for a
stolen social security number or credit card number [47]. Attackers aim to exploit
the patients’ records in the healthcare and medical sectors since the records contain
very critical data [48]. The value of medical records is sustained compared to other
documents. For instance, it may be di cult to address individual medical identity
theft but a credit card theft is easy to deal with and further harm can be prevented.
There are no available remediation strategies for dealing with medical identity theft.
This shows that the threats in healthcare industry has reached acute level [49].
When designing HIE systems, security is paramount. The following security re-
quirements should be taken into consideration:
Authenticity and Authentication: This refers to the process of establishing the
veracity of claims made by someone or about a subject [50]. The designer of an
HIE system should ensure that only authenticated users have access to the specific
information. The credentials provided by users should be compared with the database
records and if they match, access may be granted to the healthcare record system.
Non-repudiation: This is the guarantee that someone cannot deny the authenticity
of their signature or sending of a message. For example, one party cannot deny having
sent or received a transaction. Once a patient record is inserted into the system, the
employee who performed the entry cannot deny having performed the transaction.
Digital signatures and encryption should be used to establish non-repudiation [51].
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Ownership of Information: The designer of the HIE system should take into
consideration the owner of the information so as to apply the necessary measures to
protect against unauthorized access or use of the patient’s medical information. The
patient should be able to communicate their consent to the sharing of their health
information to authorized healthcare specialists [36]. HIE systems should give the
patients the privilege of granting rights to the authorized users on the basis of what
role the user plays.
Integrity: This refers to the process of ensuring the accuracy and consistency of
data. The data should be protected against unauthorized tampering through the use
of access control and encryption techniques.
Confidentiality: This means safeguarding information against unauthorized access.
Only authorized users should have access to the health and identity information. This
can be accomplished through the use of access control and encryption techniques.
Availability: Information should be available when needed. During design, the
security controls used to protect the information and the communication channels
should be tested to ensure that they are functioning correctly [14]. Ensuring that
information is available at any time makes decision-making more e cient.
1.8 Contributions of the Dissertation
The development of HIE protocols is an important milestone for the future of moni-
toring patients. It can also save lives, enhance disease management, and help medical
research achieve more e cient and e↵ective results. The goal of this dissertation is to
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address two major concerns in building practical and e cient HIE solutions: privacy
and access control, in order to secure the sharing of patient health information.
The first solution presents a system model and protocol to secure HIE among
di↵erent healthcare providers while focusing primarily on the privacy of patients’ per-
sonal and health information. The system model specifies all of the major physical
and logical components to allow secure HIE between di↵erent healthcare providers.
The protocol provides healthcare providers with the capability of mutual authenti-
cation between communicating organizations and patient authentication to his/her
home healthcare organization. The privacy is maintained through a unique way of
generating a symmetric key, at both healthcare organizations involved in the HIE,
which corresponds to the patient and is valid for the authorized session only. The
solution allows patients to authorize a certain type of health information to be re-
trieved, which helps prevent any unintentional leakage of information. It also ensures
the integrity and auditability of the health information exchanged. A security anal-
ysis and a performance study of the first protocol show that it is e cient for the
purpose of HIE and o↵ers a high level of security for such exchanges.
The second solution presents a cloud-based HIE system model and an autho-
rization protocol that fills the gap between cryptographic and non-cryptographic
approaches, with the former lacking explicit authorization enforcement mechanism
that is cryptographically secure, and the latter being complex, computationally ex-
pensive, and limited in policy specification. The protocol combines authentication
with authorization rather than combining encryption with authorization as done by
the majority of existing cryptographic approaches (ABE-based schemes). A novel
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proxy signature-based protocol is developed to enable authenticated and authorized
selective sharing of patient health information via a cloud-based HIE. The protocol
exhibits several desirable features that include non-interactive and on-demand oper-
ation, flexible specification of access control policies, audit support, and compliance
with agreements between healthcare providers and patients. The security analysis
for the protocol shows that it is secure against forgery under the well-known discrete
log assumption. The performance of the protocol using the developed trapdoor hash-
based proxy signature scheme achieves the best all-round performance while being
provably secure compared to other well-known proxy signature schemes.
1.9 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized into five chapters. Related work is presented
in Chapter 2. A background on cryptographic techniques used in the solutions is
presented in Chapter 3. The privacy protocol and its security analysis are presented
in detail in Chapter 4. The access control protocol and its security analysis are
presented in detail in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation.
Copyright c  Ahmed Fouad Shedeed Ibrahim, 2016.
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Chapter 2 Related Work
In this chapter, we review recent related work and solutions for the privacy and access
control of Health Information Exchange. The work presented is the most relevant to
the research presented in this dissertation.
2.1 Research on the Privacy of Health Information Exchange
Yu et al. 2007. An Electronic Health Record Content Protection System
Using SmartCard and PMR. [52]
Yu et al. [52] presented a patient-centric content protection system that is based on
temper-resistant hardware and widely adopted security protocols for identification,
EHR encryption, and communication. A Personalized Media Recorder (PMR) is used
to achieve high availability and interoperability of EHR content protection systems.
High density SmartCards [53] were used for the identification and authentication of
patients, healthcare providers, and support personnel. A patient’s SmartCard (P-
SmartCard) is used to encrypt the patient’s EHR content and to enforce rule-based
access control to a patient’s EHRs.
Every healthcare provider (e.g. physician, nurse, laboratory worker, etc.) who
seeks access to and creates new EHRs would use the Healthcare Provider SmartCard
(HP-SmartCard) to undeniably sign initiated transactions, other than those for iden-
tification and authentication. A specially designed hardware, called a Personalized
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Media Recorder (PRM), is used to interface with a P-SmartCard and HP-SmartCards
in order to store patients’ protected EHR transactions at the HP site and on patients’
recordable media. A secure mobile agent called V-SmartCard can emulate the func-
tionality of the patient’s real SmartCard (P-SmartCard) if it is not present. These
components run under a hardware backbone which provides public-key infrastructure
(PKI), distribution of CRLs, EHR backup, and V-SmartCard management.
Adequate cryptographic analysis of the overall scheme was not provided. The
proposed work requires that each patient has a SmartCard at the time of service.
The proposed system requires the PRM hardware to be available at every healthcare
provider. V-SmartCards can be used to impersonate the use of a real P-SmartCard,
which can create security flaws. Another concern is that at a certain threshold,
patients’ EHR privacy can be compromised if most of the patients’ information is not
signed and encrypted by the public/private key pair.
Hu et al. 2010. A hybrid public key infrastructure solution (HPKI) for
HIPAA privacy/security regulations. [54]
Hu et al. [54] proposed that patients sign a fixed time-period contract with the health-
care provider and make sure every access to the PHI during the medical treatment
process is securely authorized by the hospital and recorded for non-repudiation pur-
poses. This work presented a contract-oriented e-health security architecture which
delegates the trust and security management to the medical service provider during
the contract period of the treatment. A hybrid security scheme based on public-key
infrastructure (PKI) and smartcards is used. A PKI scheme is deployed for the mu-
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tual authentication and distribution of sensitive yet computationally non-intensive
data. Their architecture consists of a smartcard trust center (STC) that issues medi-
care smartcards and a medical center server (MCS) that belongs to the place where
a patient registers as the home medical service provider.
The MCS has its own database that stores all relevant data including its patients
PHI data. Patients are issued a smart medical care card by the STC which contains
the patient’s private-public key pair and other basic data. The STC keeps a copy of
the patients’ private-public key pair. Each MCS also needs to register with the STC
to obtain a private-public key pair. Medical personnel register with their organization
and are issued an organizational smartcard containing their private-public key pair.
At the time of treatment, the patient negotiates a contract key with the MCS
which allows the medical center unlimited access to the PHI data during medical
service period and sets an expiry date for such key. At the end of the treatment, the
PHI data and a hash of the PHI data signed by the medical personnel are encrypted
using the contract key and sent to the patient to be stored on the patient’s smartcard.
Also, the PHI data and a hash of the PHI data signed by MCS’s private key are
encrypted using STC’s public key and sent to the STC for storage. At a foreign MCS,
the patient must provide the contract key and PHI data stored on the smartcard.
If the foreign MCS wants to retrieve the patient’s PHI data from home MCS, the
patient’s contract key must be provided.
Storage of the encrypted PHI data and contract keys on the patient’s smartcard
is infeasible due to the limited storage capacity of smartcards. In the case that the
patient loses the smartcard, all stored PHI data and contract keys are lost which
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may compromise the privacy of the patient. A new smartcard must be issued by the
STC, including the patient’s key pair stored at the STC. No patient authentication
mechanism at the home MCS was proposed for when PHI data are being requested
by a foreign MCS. In fact, if a contract key is compromised, MCS can still access the
corresponding PHI data encrypted with such a key. It was proposed to use patients’
PHI data stored at the STC for emergency access, but no identification and privacy
mechanisms were proposed.
Haas et al. 2011. Aspects of Privacy for Electronic Health Records. [55]
Haas et al. [55] proposed a scheme to allow user-controlled disclosure of health data to
third parties which is divided into two subsystems: data service and patient service.
Medical systems use the data service for storing and retrieving medical data. Medical
data are indexed with a data ID and stored in an encrypted form, using a persistent
random value unique for every patient and a consecutive number for every piece of
data stored about this patient. Digital watermarking is used to tag each instance of
medical data access. The patient service o↵ers policy management, as well as logging
and verification services. It is used by patients to check the correct functioning of
the data service, which puts a lot of burden on patients and requires patient training
and continuous monitoring.
The authors proposed a scheme to allow user-controlled disclosure of health data
to third parties without forcing patients to trust the EHR system provider. Their
scheme o↵ers a privacy-management system that o↵ers patients informational self-
determination including usage control with the implicit possibility to trace data flows
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after sensitive data has been legitimately disclosed. The scheme o↵ers an access
control mechanism with audit capabilities concerning access to health data and its
disclosure to third parties.
The system for EHRs is divided into two subsystems: patient service and data
service. The patient service is the communication interface for patients. It o↵ers
policy management, a logging service, and a verification service which allow patients
to check the correct functioning of the data service. The data service controls the
disclosure and storage of EHRs. Medical systems use the data service for storing
and retrieving medical data. Before storage, medical data Dmed is encrypted using a
persistent random value RPatient,Key that is unique for every patient and a consecutive
number for every stored piece of data about this patient.
The encrypted data is indexed via a data IDdata, which is derived from a hash of
a second patient-related random number RPatient,Index, and the consecutive number.
Digital watermarking is used to tag each instance of medical data access. The tag in-
cludes the medical data provider’s identity and the requester’s identity. The sequence
of tags for the same medical data constitutes a so-called delegation chain. It is as-
sumed that every medical provider will provide a valid digital watermark with every
medical data request (read/write). Digital watermarks are validated by combining
an asymmetric fingerprinting scheme with the author’s previous work: the protocols
for a non-linkable delegation of rights by anonymous credentials [56].
The paper did not present a preventive scheme as expected. The patient service
provides nothing new, and only trivial methods were used to o↵er policy management
and the logging and verification services. The authors’ previous work [56] used in the
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digital watermark validation has not be tested nor used before. There is no way
to prove that the link between the medical provider and its digital watermark is
valid and legitimate. The system presented is not privacy-protecting and does not
enforce obligations regarding health data disclosure. Instead, an after fact method
was proposed to detect disclosures which did not meet patients’ policy access rights.
It is not clear how illegitimate disclosures can happen. The proposed scheme does
not include a way to keep track of changes in patients’ policy access rights and their
e↵ects on tracing previous disclosures. Neither security measures no a security study
were presented. Confidentiality of the medical data outside of the proposed system
and during transmission was not considered.
Vergara et al. 2015. Chains of Trust for On-Demand Requests of Elec-
tronic Health Records. [57]
Vergara et al. [57] proposed creating on-demand trust relationships among medical
institutions’ Health Record Servers (HRS) to authenticate requesters based on chains
of trust. This is approached by contacting several parties to validate the identity of
the requester and deliver the requested records. The authors propose to create an on-
demand trust relationship among participating medical institutions’ servers. As there
may not be prior relationships established between medical providers, the proposed
protocol uses two primary types of servers: Health Record Servers and Trust Servers,
that allow parties to interact with some degree of trust for the exchange of basic
(emergency information, but not complete) EHRs. Health Record Servers (HRS) are
the medical provider servers storing patients’ EHRs. Upon access requests, Trust
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Servers (TS) validate the requester (via SSL) and query other nearby trust servers
to retrieve the appropriately signed token corresponding to the HRS holding the
patient’s EHR for the requester. Finally, a signed identity token is returned to the
requester which can be presented to the HRS to access the needed records.
Trust Servers (TS) validate the requester and query other nearby Trust Servers
to retrieve a signed token corresponding to the HRS holding patient’s EHR. A signed
Identity Token is returned to the requester which can be presented to the HRS to
access the needed records. Identity tokens can then be sent to HRS holding the
patient’s EHR which validates them and sends the patient’s requested EHR to the
requester encrypted using a symmetric key agreed upon beforehand.
Identity tokens include the following information: patient ID, expiration, record
location, and signature (by a TS known to the desired HRS). These fields ensure
the integrity of the token, prevent malicious users from impersonating a requester,
and prevent the requester from obtaining the records of a di↵erent person. Identity
tokens can then be sent to the HRS holding the patient’s EHRs. HRS validates the
received identity token and then sends the requested patient’s EHRs encrypted (using
a symmetric key agreed upon beforehand) to the requester.
There are many issues with this work. It operates on mobile devices only and
no protocol was proposed to operate in any existing healthcare provider’s system.
The protocol is designed to handle emergency access only, so the access is limited
to basic information and no approach to gain full access was presented. It has no
privacy policy, no patient consent requirement, and no process of patient digital
approval. Other trust mechanisms should be studied to handle di↵erent roles and
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access restrictions rather than trusting requesters with full access to basic health
records immediately.
The communication between the requester and the Health Record Server is always
done using the same unique symmetric key generated by the system for all communi-
cation to decrease the cost of encryption and decryption, which is not a secure solution
for long term implementation. Tests of the proposed protocol were performed using
only three Trust Servers in extremely close proximity. This approach contacts several
parties to validate the identity of the requester which will require much longer TS
hops to locate the correct TS responsible for signing the Identity token. A real world
deployment of the protocol may require many more Trust Server hops to locate the
correct Trust Server responsible for signing the identity token. This may become pro-
hibitively expensive to set up or practically impossible to implement. Clearly, there
are several weaknesses in the protocol that need to be addressed before it can be used
in the real world.
2.2 Research on the Access Control of Health Information Exchange
Wang et al. 2012. Implementing a Personal Health Record Cloud Platform
using Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption. [58]
Wang et. al. [58] propose a model that can be used to overcome the challenges associ-
ated with Personal Health Records (PHRs). The proposal was based on the argument
that information privacy issues arise during data movement from the PHR systems
to the clouds, which leads to the exposure of certain data that is confidential and if
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released, could result in patient embarrassment. To avoid this, the authors propose
the application of a Cipher-text Policy ABE (CP-ABE) which helps maintain privacy
by encrypting data before it is sent over the PHR. This is necessary since convention-
ally, data on the PHR can be downloaded by anyone. The objective of the proposed
CP-ABE system is to ensure that although this data can be downloaded by anyone,
its decryption is on an access controlled basis. The proposed system architecture
operates based on various key security requirements which include: maintenance of
transit health data confidentiality, integrity of health data, health data authenticity,
patient centric control of data access, and flexibility in data revocation.
Based on the provided security requirements, the key participants of the proposed
CP- ABE include the health care providers, patients, and providers of cloud services,
as well as the PHR viewers and attribute authorities. These participants use the
system architecture which is defined through actions such as the set-up of the systems,
conversion of the EHR data into more manageable PHR data, data encryption via the
PHR, sending requests, generation of identity key and data decryption at the recipient
end. The system set-up procedure involves the organization of both hardware and
software components into structures that support the running of the proposed system.
The facility-generated EHRs are then converted into PHR systems which enable the
data to be handled on a patient centric basis. This allows the patient to define
the attributes associated with health records and to encrypt the data in the PHR.
The encrypted data is then transferred into the public cloud proxy. As highlighted
previously, the key objective of the proposed system is to prevent privacy losses
during data transfer. The generated identity key can only be used by the intended
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data recipient to decrypt the data from the PHR.
This architecture operates through a procedure that involves provision of a set
of attributes which go beyond the conventional occupation and work place status
requirements. The attributes provided by the patient include the name, gender,
date of birth, marital status, work place, and patient address, as well as the desired
expiration of the PHR. Of these attributes, only the name is regarded by the system
as a non-numerical value while all other data are classified as numerical and are
modified to fit the assigned category. For instance, the date of birth is translated
to age while the marital status is encoded as a numeric value of 0 or 1. Only the
data considered general, such as marital status, gender, and address, are stored in
the server, while the remaining attribute data are stored in the private cloud system.
The access policy used by the system is designed by the owner and embedded in
the Cipher-text used for the CP-ABE. In comparison with other previous work that
applies ABEs in the healthcare sector for EHRs, the proposed system was evaluated
based on its capability to reduce privacy concerns during data transfer and was found
to be feasible. While other studies focus on the use of Identity Based Encryption,
this proposal works through the di↵erences between conventional ABEs. The authors
therefore conclude that the CP-Based ABE system is better in terms of privacy
achievement during data transfer as compared to Identity Based ABEs. Moreover,
the system also helps to avoid unwarranted decryption due to the presence of access
keys, which are designed to be used to access information related to the case in
question.
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Li et al. 2013. Scalable and Secure Sharing of Personal Health Records in
Cloud Computing Using Attribute-Based Encryption. [59]
Another study that focuses on the use of ABE systems in the management of EHRs
was carried out by [59]. According to these authors, the key issues related to the use
of PHRs include exposure of user privacies, flexibility of information access, and the
e ciency of user revocation in accessing information on patient health records. To
address these issues, the authors propose a model for using Attribute-Based Tech-
niques in PHRs. In particular, the authors propose a system that addresses the
concern about multi-user capabilities in the handling of PHRs. The applicability
of the system involves situations where multiple users are required to access the re-
quired information without having to expose the health records to the general public
or unauthorized personnel. According to these authors, privacy issues in PHRs arise
mainly during data outsourcing, especially where there is multi user access to infor-
mation. To address this concern, a patient centric system is recommended for the
incorporation of access keys for use by di↵erent recipients. The authors’ proposal
involves the use of multi-authority data access ABE to achieve privacy as well as to
enable dynamics for data modification through access policies.
The proposed ABE architecture is described as a Multi Authority ABE (MA-
ABE) and is designed to operate based on key performance requirements which in-
clude: data confidentiality, revocation on demand capabilities, scalability, e ciency,
usability, flexibility, and control of access. Data confidentiality is planned to be such
that any unauthorized persons lacking su cient attributes matching the demands of
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the system are not allowed to access the users’ data under any conditions. Simi-
larly, authorized persons whose attributes are no longer valid can have their access
authorities revoked. The users who have access to the patients’ data should also be
restricted in their potential operations through control of activities such as modi-
fication of patient details. This framework operates using a multi authority ABE.
The architecture involves several data users, multiple owners, as well as numerous
public/private domains (PSDs) and attribute authorities (AAs). This implies that
for each patient, the operations must involve system set-ups and data encryption at
the first stage of the information management system. The encryption is carried out
based on common data attributes shared across all PSDs with emergency attributes
assigned across the break glass strategy.
The proposed framework allows multi-user access to health information. The
patient is referred to as the PHR owner and is tasked with creating the patient file
using various labels. The data is then encrypted according to the patient’s data labels
through the use of Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and a role-based access policy for file
access. The encryption applied using the patient’s own labels aims to restrict access
to files considered confidential and the access can only be achieved after authorization
by the patient through provision of a break glass key. The role-based access is defined
through the use of recommended settings or based on the patient’s definition settings.
For instance, the patient may describe the role-based access to be restricted only
to recipients with attributes that align to the terms ’physician and doctor’. From
this point of view, the physician and/or doctor cannot access the patient’s private
information encrypted with own data labels. The break glass key is provided for
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use in Emergency departments by those who have access to the key and/or the first
labels.
In the proposed multi-model framework, each patient is supposed to have control
over his/her own PHR and is considered a trusted authority over the data. The
accessibility of the data by outside recipients is controlled by the data owner through
the use of the KP- ABE system which helps to create the first key. The combination of
the patient-centric design through which KP-ABE is used and the multi-user interface
enables the PHR to have a self-protecting attribute which makes it possible to protect
information from unauthorized access through the break glass key. Moreover, the
enhancements made to the conventional ABE have made it possible to prevent data
infiltration even by semi-trusted recipients. However, the data owners are allowed to
make changes to the PHR documents through attribute changes in the Cipher-text
policy. The key modifications allowed in the cipher text include addition, deletion,
and editing.
Tong et al. 2014. Scalable and Secure Sharing of Personal Health Records
in Cloud Computing Using Attribute-Based Encryption. [60]
Tong et al. [60] examined the possibility of providing role-based access control and
auditability for PHRs through the integration of ABE with threshold signing for data.
The objective of this proposal was to prevent misuse of PHRs in both normal and
emergency contexts. The paper begins the introduction to the proposed ABE frame-
work through a discussion of the various concepts associated with ABE use in PHRs.
The proposed system model is comprised of four key parts, which include a private
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cloud, public cloud, PHR user, and EMT. In this context, the EMT refers to the
Emergency Medical Technician who is the physician tasked with o↵ering emergency
treatment services to the patient.
The interactions between these four components in the system model are such
that each user collects their own data through recording devices that are either worn
or carried by the user. Each of the users is supported on a private cloud. Many such
private clouds are then supported through a physical server. The private clouds are
always present online and can be accessed in case of emergency. Before storing the
data in the public clouds, the private clouds add security encryptions to the data.
While proposing this system model, the authors assume that the connection between
the user and their private cloud is secure and that it o↵ers a secure opportunity to
negotiate the network key to be used in the system.
The system proposed functions based on a threats model described by the private
cloud’s actions and the suspicions of the public clouds. The private clouds are trusted
by the user while the public clouds are treated as honest but also suspected to be
curious. This is based on the argument that the public cloud does not attempt to
delete the user’s data or modify it in any way, but does try to compromise the privacy
of the user. To avoid such occurrences, public clouds are not allowed to access the
user’s sensitive health information. This makes it di cult for the user’s information
to be jeopardized. Similarly, the EMT is considered honest in their dealings in that
they do not access information not pertaining to health records or information that is
not role-based. The only information accessed by the EMT is that which is relevant
to the case solution and thus applicable for the treatment of the patient.
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The system proposed operates using various security requirements which include
data privacy and auditability. The privacy concerns are resolved through various
requirements such as confidentiality, anonymity, unlink ability, keyword privacy, and
search pattern privacy. While implementing the proposed ABE system with threshold
signing, the authors began by constructing the secure index for the PHR, meant to
be used for data preservation; encrypting the data files with a time tag inference;
hiding the data patterns in the private clouds, and retrieving data files based on user
request. During data retrieval, the private cloud is used to compute a trap door, and
then sends it to the required public cloud, which provides the address relevant to the
required data. This operation procedure involves online operations and can only be
achieved by meeting the system security requirements.
In comparison to other systems such as CP-ABE, IBE, and the threshold secret
sharing, the proposed ABE plus threshold signing provides an e cient interface for
the management of patient data. While the other forms of PHR management achieve
key features of maintaining the privacy of the data, the proposal by these authors
maintains privacy while also enhancing the auditability of the data in the system. On
the other hand, the proposed framework di↵ers from the MA-ABE proposed by Li et
al. [59] in that while the latter provides an opportunity for multi-user access to data,
the paper by Tong et. al. [60] provides only a framework that achieves auditability
while still maintaining the single user access protocol. When evaluating the proposed
framework for performance, the authors used an approach based on communication
and storage e ciency, in addition to the auditability of the entered records and com-
putational e ciency. These were the key measures of e↵ective performance when
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evaluated from the viewpoint of the authors.
In conclusion, the authors stated their study had accomplished the design objec-
tives of achieving auditability through the use of techniques relevant to the situation.
Through the use of a redundancy-based pattern hiding technique and the incorpora-
tion of access control in emergency situations, the authors managed to achieve their
user-centric PHR design plans. Recommendations for future research include devising
mechanisms that can be used to detect whether there have been leakages of patient
data and to identify the possible sources.
Fabian et al. 2015. Collaborative and Secure Sharing of Healthcare Data
in Multi-Clouds. [61]
The use of ABE is also discussed and implemented by [61] through the proposal
to disperse data across several clouds through an integrated ABE with a Crypto-
graphic secret sharing procedure. The basis for the proposal is the understanding
that PHR systems are often faced with the challenge of data privacy and security,
particularly during information sharing. The authors propose a combined method
for the achievement of inter-organizational information sharing. The proposed sys-
tem uses an architecture based on the application of a client-centered design to share
information across various organizations. According to the authors, the big data
era has led to an increasing need for information sharing across various health care
organizations which results in privacy concerns and data security issues. The pro-
posed architecture functions through interactions across various security and privacy
requirements which include: confidentiality of medical records and their existence,
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patient anonymity in the medical records, unlinkability between the records and pa-
tients, integrity and availability of records, user authentication, fine-grained access
control and authorization, and anonymity of user capabilities, among others.
The architecture proposes data signing and encryption by patients at di↵erent
health facilities, and that the encrypted data is then sent to multiple cloud systems
in which the data is split and stored. The data from the various health facilities
stored in independent cloud servers are then connected with data from various other
cloud proxies. The summary of the architecture involves the signing and encryption
of medical information by the doctor’s software. The encrypted information is then
sent to the local proxy of multiple clouds, which splits the information according to
the scheme for secret sharing. In the third step, external identification indices are
constructed by the multi-cloud proxies so that access to the data is possible from both
ends. The data saved in the multi-cloud proxies is accessible by any authority given
the identifier index for the particular patient. This enables the patient’s information
to be shared across di↵erent healthcare facilities, given a patient authorization. As
such, the PHRs are made available across the board. The retrieval process involves
access of information from the patient’s health records through the proxies. The
cloud proxies corresponding to the particular patient’s access information are based
on that client’s health records, which are authenticated via the proxies and decrypted.
The decrypted data is then sent to the doctor who confirms its authenticity in the
particular context.
While addressing the security concerns for the data, the authors assume that all
parties with access to the PHRs have common interest in upholding the privacy of the
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patient information. However, the authors also recognize that in spite of formulation
of common security objectives, procedural challenges may also arise during imple-
mentation, which calls for further system refinement since the authors believe that
this is beyond the scope of the present study. In implementing the ABE system, the
authors suggested a combination of a role-based access policy with CP-ABE would
ensure that patient data are only accessed using user-defined attributes belonging to
the patient. In using the CP-ABE, the party that encrypts the data incorporates an
access control policy, based on pre-defined role-based terminology, into the encryption
to ensure that only those recipients whose descriptions match the attributes in the
user defined data can access the data.
Similarly, the application of secret sharing algorithms is based on the need for
privacy through the use of a threshold scheme which involves the sharing of documents
across a given number of parties. Access to information stored through threshold
secret sharing is limited since the access can only be achieved through the availability
of at least a given number of participants in the framework. A combination of two
algorithms referred to as a space e cient algorithm, which allows the storage of data
in transit and the secret sharing scheme, allows for encryption of the data. The space
e cient algorithm is considered favorable for the storage of data that crosses over
multiple users while the secret sharing scheme enhances the privacy maintenance of
the system. The implementation of the entire system proposal requires that various
concerns be resolved. The evaluation of the performance of the proposed architecture
was based on experimentation which led to a realization of e cient performance and
feasibility. Despite being limited in terms of addressing the issues of several open
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tasks and failure to support multiple diverse interfaces, the study proved conclusive
in obtaining a response from the PHR.
A comparison between various proposed frameworks for the use of PHRs through
ABE has shown that despite being on par with recommendations such as MA-ABE
and CP-ABE, the proposed combination CP-ABE and cryptographic secret sharing
makes it a strong enough system for use in the multi-proxy settings where the applied
data is usable across di↵erent health facilities. The authors thus conclude that the
proposed framework addresses the issues of good performance and feasibility. Future
research, however, is recommended for aspects of key management and role-based
access control (RBAC) [62] policy management.
Guo et al. 2015. PAAS: A Privacy-Preserving Attribute-Based Authenti-
cation System for eHealth Networks. [63]
Guo et al. [63] present another framework for the use of ABE in PHR which involves
only two end users. In the proposed scheme, the framework aims to maintain the
conventional accuracy and convenience associated with PHRs while also addressing
the need for sustainable PHR privacy through the incorporation of a Privacy Preserv-
ing Attribute-based Authentication System (PAAS). The PAAS proposed uses the
verifiable user attributes to authenticate PHR users and thus protect their privacy.
Through a combination of the ABE system with authentication procedures that have
progressive privacy capabilities and requirements between the patients and physi-
cians, the proposed system provides a sustainable privacy-preserving feature which is
applicable in the health care sector for the handling of patient health records. The
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proposed method relies heavily on the use of ABE and the authentication of user
data to enhance record keeping security and data privacy.
As an operational framework, the authors suggest a system model based on ABE
rather than the conventional identity-based Encryption procedure that is used in sev-
eral PHRs. The system framework uses a Trust Authority (TA) for the verification of
patient information and privacy preservation. This TA is responsible for the distri-
bution of the PHR key to the users and serves as a semi-trusted center contact. The
semi-trusted registration center (RC) functions as the generator in the system, whose
task is to generate user credentials based on the particular attributes of the user as
recorded by the system. The RC verifies the physician’s professional attributes and
then issues the matching credentials to the physician. As a result, the RC can fre-
quently update the credentials as needed. In this system model, the patients can also
update their credentials based on given attributes such as observed symptoms. The
key advantage of this system model is that it allows the physicians and patients to
interact on an anonymous basis, with the patients only giving information about their
symptoms and past medical history and the doctor being assigned to cases based on
their professional credentials. There is continuous interaction between patients and
physicians through this system model, which enables the change of attributes due
to change in observations. The patient and doctor are assumed to be within the
transmission ranges for cloud data whenever required.
The proposed framework is also built on the basis of a security preservation model
based on the need to preserve each user’s confidential information on four key fronts.
According to the design proposed by the authors, the four privacy levels include:
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PAAS0, PAAS1, PAAS2 and PAAS3, which require physicians to show their valid
professional qualifications in the first phase. The second phase involves the preserva-
tion of the patients’ privacy through the valuation of user attributes while the third
phase helps to maintain privacy between two or more interacting patients. The last
phase involves the protection of all patients’ information from unwarranted exposure.
The operation of the proposed system involves the generation of a parameter that is
used as the user’s public key. This parameter is generated by the TA and can be used
by any number of users. The generated parameter is thus distributed across the board
to relevant professional recipients. The generated key is used for data encryption at
the patient end and for the subsequent decryption of the data at the recipient’s end.
While analyzing the system for performance e↵ectiveness, the authors based their
evaluation on the aspects of security and e ciency in the operations of the proposed
system. Through numerical analyses, it became clear that potential security attacks
on the various phases of privacy preservation demand protection of each phase inde-
pendently. The e↵ectiveness of the proposed PAAS system is based on the availability
of several privacy protection phases. While the study findings are relevant and highly
supported, the vulnerability associated with multiple user systems is not addressed.
Copyright c  Ahmed Fouad Shedeed Ibrahim, 2016.
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Chapter 3 Preliminaries
This chapter discusses cryptographic techniques which are used in the development of
solutions presented in this dissertation. In the context of computer science, cryptog-
raphy is the study of securing electronic communication between parties. It involves
developing techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping, impersonation, and
message modification.
Before 1976, cryptography focused solely on message secrecy. Several algorithms
and techniques were developed to o↵er message confidentiality using symmetric keys,
where both the sender and receiver share the same key. Symmetric key cryptography
techniques are described in section 3.1. In 1976, new directions in cryptography were
introduced by W. Di e and M. Hellman [64]: public key cryptosystem and one-way
authentication. Public key cryptography (asymmetric cryptography), which use two
keys (public and private), are described in Section 3.2.
A brief history of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) and its two types, along with
the strengths and weaknesses of this encryption method are presented in Section 3.3.
Recent cryptographic hash functions and their weaknesses are discussed in Section
3.4. The concept of trapdoor hash functions and their advantages are presented in
Section 3.5.
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3.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
Symmetric key cryptography, also known as conventional encryption, refers to an
encryption method in which the cryptographic key used for encrypting plaintext is the
same key used for decrypting the ciphertext. This type of encryption demonstrates
good performance; it is simple and fast to use, and thus used frequently. Symmetric
key encryption is suitable for use where there is bulk encryption. This encryption
method is classified into stream ciphers or block ciphers.
Many advantages are attributed to symmetric key encryption. In fact, symmet-
ric key encryption uses less computer resources compared to asymmetric encryption
and protects against widespread message security compromise One compromised key
a↵ects only a single pair of parties, leaving other communications secure. Also, sym-
metric key encryption is relatively fast to encrypt and decrypt messages [65]. On
the other hand, symmetric key encryption has its disadvantages. Key sharing is the
biggest problem. A secure method is needed to exchange the shared key with the
other party. Thus, symmetric key encryption is more useful when encrypting one’s
own information than when encrypting shared data.
Additionally, when the symmetric key encryption is compromised, more damage
is caused. Both parties using the shared key are a↵ected when the encryption is
compromised. The existence of too many keys poses a security challenge in managing
and securing all keys. It o↵ers privacy through the secret key sharing but cannot be
used for authentication since the key can be shared by more than one person and
cannot be linked to an identity. Authentication must be dealt with separately before
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a symmetric key can be used. There is no guarantee of the authenticity and origin
of a message. This becomes a problem when a dispute arises since the origin of the
message cannot be verified due to the use of a common key between the receiver and
sender [66].
The security strength of a symmetric key encryption can be measured by the time
and cost needed to decrypt the message. A strong symmetric key encryption should
ensure that the time taken to decrypt the message is longer than the expected life-
time of the message. Upon successful decryption, the attacker would realize that the
information has already been used for the intended purpose. The decryption process
will be regarded as a waste of time. Also, the cost involved in decrypting the message
should be greater than the expected value of the information. The attacker will tend
to avoid undertaking the attack because the process of cracking the ciphertext would
have no benefit, rather, it would be a loss [67].
Attacks on symmetric key encryption include frequency analysis, where language
is analyzed for the pattern of words to gather clues for attacking the ciphertext, and
brute force, which occurs when one attempts to decrypt the encrypted message using
every possible key. Although many attempts fail, one key usually works. This kind
of attack cannot be prevented. Choosing a long key makes the attack impossible.
Cryptanalysis occurs when an encrypted message is deciphered without knowing the
key, but rather using a combination of sophisticated mathematics and computing
power. The cryptanalyst can aim to discover the plaintext using the ciphertext or
discovering the encryption key using the ciphertext.
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Aman-in-the-middle attack occurs when the attacker taps a secure communication
and can intercept, or even substitute, the key. System based attacks refer to a
type of attack where the cryptographic system is attacked instead of attacking the
algorithm itself. Reverse engineering can be used to deconstruct the encryption device
in order to extract the plaintext. A side-channel attack is where the cryptanalyst
gains information about the physical implementation of a particular cryptographic
system [68]. Next, we discuss some popular symmetric key encryption methods.
3.1.1 Rivest Cipher (RC4)
RC4 is a stream cipher type of symmetric key encryption designed in 1987 by Ron
Rivest of RSA Security. It is widely used in most popular protocols like SSL (to
protect internet tra c) and WEP (to secure wireless networks). The RC4 generates a
pseudo-random key-stream that is combined with the plaintext using XOR operation
for encryption and decryption. RC4 was used for a period of 28 years, between 1987
and 2015. The key size ranges between 64 and 256 bits.
RC4 is weak due to the inadequacies in its structure and key generation. Currently,
RC4 is considered unsafe at any key size. Attacks to break RC4 began in 2013 and
improved in 2015 to make defeating RC4’s security practical. Statistical biases in the
RC4 table were discovered in 2013, which were used, along with a large number of TLS
encryptions, to recover parts of the plaintext. RC4 is not used today because many
modern browsers have been designed to defeat the BEAST attacks which a↵ected
the CBC ciphers of the RC4 [65]. Its prohibition was due to attacks that weakened
SSL/TLS (discussed in Subsection 3.2.4) using RC4.
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3.1.2 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a symmetric key encryption block cipher
developed by International Business Machines (IBM) in the early 1970’s. DES was
used beginning in the early 1970’s and up until 1998. Its block size is 64-bit. 8-bits
of the 64 are used during parity checks; thus, the key is 56-bits. For encryption,
the plaintext is used as the input for the DES algorithm and the keys Ki, where
i 2 {1, ..., 16} used throughout the iterations. For decryption, the input to the DES
algorithm is the ciphertext, and the keys Ki are used in reverse order starting with
K16 and going to K1.
An attack on DES was made possible by the presence of weaknesses in the Feistel
structure used in its design. DES was broken in 1998 by Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion by trying all the possible keys using known input and output. It took 22 hours
and 15 minutes to break a DES key. The maximum number of attempts to find the
correct key is 256. DES is not used today because it is regarded as insecure for most
applications due to its 56-bit key being too small [69].
3.1.3 Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES)
3DES refers to a block cipher type of symmetric key encryption that is an advance-
ment of the DES cipher algorithm. It processes the data three times. The DES algo-
rithm is applied three times to every 64-bit block of data using three keys (K1, K2,
and K3). Encryption and decryption are similar to that of DES, however, in 3DES,
they are done three times. The encryption process includes encryption-decryption-
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encryption while the decryption process involves decryption-encryption-decryption.
The encryption algorithm is:
ciphertext = EK3(DK2(EK1(plaintext)))
where DES uses K1 to encrypt the plaintext (first instance) and then K2 to decrypt
the second instance then K3 to encrypt the third instance. The decryption is done
in reverse:
plaintext = DK1(EK2(DK3(ciphertext)))
where DES uses K3 to decrypt the ciphertext (first instance) then K2 to encrypt the
second instance then K1 to decrypt the third instance.
The keys used for the encryption process are also used for the decryption process.
Both the plaintext and ciphertext are 64-bits each. The key sizes can be 56,112, or
168 bits. There are three keying options for 3DES. The first keying option uses the
same key (56-bits) for all encryption/decryption processes. The second keying option
uses two keys (2 x 56-bits = 112-bits), where the first key is used for encrypting
the first and last instances while the second key is used for decrypting the middle
instance. The third keying option uses three di↵erent keys (3 x 56-bits = 168-bits),
where the first key is used for encrypting the first instance, the second key is used
for decrypting the middle instance, and the third key is used for encrypting the last
instance.
3DES was established in 1998 and has been in use since. However, due to its poor
performance in software implementations, it is not widely used. Each key is 64-bits
including parity bits. The longer the key, the stronger and more secure the algorithm
is. 3DES is more secure than DES. For 3DES with 2 keys, it would take 2112 attempts
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to find the correct key, while for 3DES it would take 2168 attempts. Breaking 3DES is
not practical and is considered more secure but very slow for software implementation,
and is thus considered ine cient [70].
3.1.4 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption technique executes data in groups
of 128 bits. The technique was first developed in 2001 and has since become the stan-
dard for symmetric encryption [71]. The algorithm uses a substitution-permutation
network principle to eliminate the Feistel structure’s weakness. The principle com-
bines permutations and substitutions on 128-bit blocks and has key sizes of 128, 192,
or 256 bits. The algorithm runs the plaintext through a number of transformation
rounds to compute the ciphertext. The number of rounds is influenced by the key
size. The algorithm, using 128, 192, or 256 bit keys, performs 10, 12, or 14 rounds,
respectively. As the number of rounds increase, it becomes more di cult to crack the
encrypted data.
Each round consists of four processes known as SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns,
and AddRoundKey. The SubBytes process involves the use of a lookup table to check
the value that replaces each byte. The ShiftRows process contains a specific number
of rows in which individual rows of the condition are shifted by a certain o↵set in
a cyclical manner, leaving the initial row unmodified. In the MixColumns process,
combination operations take place through invertible linear changes where the four
bytes in each column are mixed in individual columns. Finally, in the AddRoundKey
process, round keys are generated based on Rijndael’s key technique and added to
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individual bytes of the condition by combining round key bytes with the correspond-
ing state byte. The final round in the algorithm does not involve the MixColumns
process.
AES is used to secure many critical systems and information in many organiza-
tions all over the world. The size of the key is used to determine the time required
for a successful crack of the algorithm. A large key size completely hinders the break
of AES by any attack including a brute-force attack. As indicated in table 3.1, it
would take much more than a billion year to crack a 128-bit AES key.
Table 3.1: Time Needed to Crack AES Keys
Key size Time to crack
128-bits 1.020 ⇤ 1018 years
198-bits 1.872 ⇤ 1037 years
256-bits 3.310 ⇤ 1056 years
The e↵ectiveness of an AES increases with the increased size of the encryption
key [72]. Moreover, the AES encryption method has never been breached by brute
force attacks. In summary, AES is able to deter attacks and is currently impractical to
crack [73]. Thus, the Advanced Encryption Standard is the best symmetric encryption
to implement. However, researchers are currently working to determine the potential
possibility of side-channel attacks [68].
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3.2 Public Key Encryption
Public key encryption uses a pair of keys, a public key and a private key, generated
in such a way that the private key cannot be derived from the public key. The
public key is distributed publicly while the private key is kept secret. The two keys
are related in that the message encrypted using a public key can only be decrypted
using the corresponding private key. Public key cryptography achieves confidentiality,
authentication, and non-repudiation. To achieve confidentiality on this platform, data
is encrypted using the receiver’s public key and can only be decrypted by the party
with the corresponding private key. In order to attain authentication, the data is
encrypted with the sender’s private key such that the sender is authenticated when
the receiver successfully decrypts the data with the corresponding public key. Non-
repudiation can be achieved by digital signatures (discussed in Subsection 3.2.2).
The security strength of the public key cryptography depends on the di culty
of calculating certain mathematical problems, such as factoring the product of two
large prime numbers or computing discrete logarithms. Public key cryptography
has advantages over other methods of encryption. It o↵ers increased security and
convenience. There is no need to exchange private keys and thus, key distribution
problems are eliminated. Some disadvantages attributed to public key cryptography
are that the speed of encryption and decryption are relatively low. Additionally, this




RSA is a public key cryptography developed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adleman in 1977 [74]. Since then, it has been widely used in insecure networks,
like the Internet, for securing the transmission of sensitive data. The Rabin-Miller
primality test algorithm is used to generate two large prime numbers, p and q. The
two prime numbers are multiplied to produce the modulus n which links both the
public and private keys. The modulus is expressed in bits and forms the key length.
The public key is comprised of the modulus and a public exponent e. The private key
is composed of the modulus n and the private exponent d. The extended Euclidean
algorithm is used to calculate the private exponent e. The multiplicative inverse,
with respect to the totient of n, can be computed through this calculation. Here are
the public-private key generation steps:
1. Select two prime numbers p and q.
2. Obtain the modulus n by multiplying the two prime numbers (p and q).
3. Calculate the totient of n:  (n) = (p  1) ⇤ (q   1).
4. Choose the public key exponent e as an integer where 1 < e <   such that
gcd( (n), e) = 1.
5. Calculate the value for private exponent d using the extended Euclidean Algo-
rithm where 1 < d <  (n) such that ed ⌘ 1mod  (n).
The public key is (e, n) and the private key is (d, n). The values of d, p, q and
 (n) are kept secret. To encrypt a message (M) using the receiver’s public key (for
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confidentiality), the ciphertext is calculated as:
C = M e mod n
and the receiver can decrypt the ciphertext (C) to retrieve M using its private key
(d, n) as follows:
M = Cd mod n
Fortunately, the calculations work due to the property of modular arithmetic:
[ (a mod n) ⇤ (b mod n) ]mod n = (a ⇤ b)mod n
Therefore, when M is encrypted by being raised to the power e mod n, it can be
retrieved on the receiver’s side as follows:
M = Cd mod n ⌘ (M e)d mod n ⌘M ed mod n ⌘M mod n
Figure 3.1 shows how the RSA encryption/decryption works over insecure channels
to achieve confidentiality.
Figure 3.1: RSA Encryption/Decryption
To achieve authentication, a message M can be encrypted using the sender’s
private key (d, n) and the receiver (or anyone who knows the corresponding public key)
can use the sender’s public key to decrypt the message and ensure the authenticity
of the sender. However, it is very time consuming to encrypt the whole message,
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so, a more e cient way of achieving authentication is digital signatures (where the
signature is applied to a digest of the original message) which is discussed in detail
in Subsection 3.2.2.
Breaking an RSA that is using a su cient key size is not practical due to the
di culty of factoring very large prime numbers. As mentioned in [1], in order to
factor a 1024 bit key, it would take the Special Number Field Sieve (SNPS) and
General Number Field Sieve (GNFS) factoring algorithms about 107 and 1011 MIPS-
years (a million-instructions-per-second processor running for one year), respectively.
In order to factor a 2048 bit key, it would take the two algorithms about 1014 and
1020 MIPS-years, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.2. In 2010, Kleinjung et al. [75]
announced that they were able to factor a 768 bit key using about 1000 cores in two
years. They also anticipated that, using the same hardware, it would take 7481 years
to crack a 1024 bit key. To date, there is no known algorithm that can factor two
large randomly chosen prime numbers, like p and q, from their product. Factoring a
1024 bit key is quite complex and would require a long amount of time to break. The
current recommended key length for a secure RSA transmission is 2048 bits [76].
3.2.2 Digital Signatures
A digital signature refers to a technique that is used to validate the integrity and
authenticity of software, digital documents, or a message. Digital signatures bind
a document with its signer. It is used to eradicate the problem of impersonation
and tampering in communications, which take place digitally. Digital signatures are
used to fulfill the fundamental intentions of data security which include integrity,
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Figure 3.2: MIPS-years Needed to Factor RSA Keys [1]
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authentication, and non-repudiation. Authentication is achieved through the use of
corresponding private and public keys. Only the receiver with the corresponding
public key can successfully decrypt the message. Integrity is achieved by comparing
whether or not the hash values match to ensure that the message has not been
tampered with during transmission. Non-repudiation is when the signer cannot deny
having signed the document or message if their keys have not been compromised.
In order to create a digital signature, as shown in Figure 3.3, a hash (message
digest) of the document to be signed is first computed. The hash value is then
encrypted using the signer’s private key to produce the signature. Both the message
and signature are then sent to the verifier (receiver). In order to verify a digital
Figure 3.3: Digital Signatures Creation Process
signature, as shown in Figure 3.4, the verifier computes the hash (message digest)
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of the received document and decrypts the signature using the signer’s public key
to verify the authenticity of the signature and retrieve the signed hash. The digital
signature is considered valid if the computed hash matches the decrypted hash.
Figure 3.4: Digital Signatures Verification Process
3.2.3 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) refers to the set of policies, roles, and procedures that
have been designed to create, manage, use, store, and revoke digital certificates and
manage public-key encryption. This infrastructure aims to provide authentication,
non-repudiation, confidentiality, integrity, and access control to a particular set of
digital data. It enables secure data exchange over networks and identity verification
between the computer and user by supporting the distribution and identification of
public encryption keys. It ensures authentication by assuring identity and is used for
ensuring security for any sensitive data exchange.
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PKI consists of software, hardware, standards, and policies used for managing
the creation, administration, distribution, and revocation of digital certificates and
keys. The typical elements of PKI include: a certificate authority (CA), which is a
trusted party that serves as the root of trust and provides authentication services
for the identities of entities like computers and individuals, a registration authority
which is certified by the root CA for issuing certificates for specific uses that have
been permitted by the root CA, and a certificate database for storing requests for
certificates. PKI also possesses the ability to issue and revoke certificates and has a
certificate cache for storing issued certificates and private keys.
A digital certificate refers to an attachment that is applied to an electronic mes-
sage to ensure security. It is used to authenticate the message sender’s identity and
also provides a mechanism that enables the receiver to encode a reply. The sender
applies for the digital certificate from a certificate authority. A CA issues digital
certificates to the applicants containing their public key and other information meant
for identification purposes. Each digital certificate is only valid for a specific period
of time and is issued by a particular CA. A public key belonging to the CA is made
available through print or over the Internet and is used by recipients to verify the
digital certificate. The recipient obtains the sender’s public key and identification
information after verifying the digital certificate. This information is used by the
recipient to encrypt messages to the certificate holder.
A chain of trust refers to the trust relationship between identities when using
Subordinate Certificate Authorities to allow easy delegation of digital certificates.
The signing process in a chain of trust entails signing of the intermediate certificate by
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the root CA using its private key. This shows that the root CA trusts the intermediate
certificate. On the next level, the Subordinate CA signs the identity certificate using
its private key to authenticate that it trusts the identity certificate. A Chain-of-
Trust has several problems or weaknesses. If one entity like a CA is compromised,
the entire public key infrastructure security is at risk. Also, the user must assume
that all entities in the chain are honest, which may not be always true.
Chain of Trust Limitations
In the overall PKI trust model, all aspects, including users, administrators, the key
management server, and any third-party key management entity must be able to trust
one another so that the keys and identities of those using the keys are trusted. Usually,
communicating parties develop trust over time according to their communication
progress. You can trust a certificate only if you can trust the CA that issued it,
and you can trust that CA only if you can trust a CA above it in the chain. The
validated chain then implies the authenticity of all the certificates. However, PKI
authentication is vulnerable when used in initial contact due to the “Chain of Trust”
concept and a lack of prior trust and communication.
As stated in [77], a certificate hardly implies the level of trust in a party’s iden-
tity. It is possible to have a suspicious intermediate CA which threatens a party’s
authenticity. It is di cult to establish trust for the sets of public and private keys
of geographically dispersed entities on intranets and the Internet. Subsequently, it
is hard to completely trust the relationship between users and the CA that certified
their public key and to specify the relationship in their certificate.
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3.2.4 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocols
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol refers to the secure communication protocol
used to secure any transmission over the Transfer Control Protocol (TCP). It aims
to provide privacy and reliability between two communicating applications. Privacy
is achieved by encrypting the connection. Identity identification is ensured through
the use of certificates. Reliability is maintained through message integrity checks by
performing dependable maintenance of the secure connection.
SSL was originally developed by Hickman and Elgamal at Netscape [78]. Due to
security flaws in version 1.0, it was never publicly released. Version 2.0 was released in
1995, though it too had flaws. These flaws led to the development of version 3.0 which
was released in 1996. Version 3.0 was considered insecure due to its vulnerability
to poodle attacks [79] [80] a↵ecting all block ciphers in SSL. SSL version 2.0 was
prohibited in 2011 [81] due to its lack of protection of handshake messages and usage
of Message Digest 5 (MD5) authentication, while the prohibition of SSL 3.0 began in
2015 [82].
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol guarantees data integrity and pri-
vacy between communicating applications over a network like the Internet. This
protocol is comprised of two layers. The first layer is the TLS Record Protocol,
which is at the top of a reliable transport protocol to ensure that a connection is
secure. It encapsulates the higher-level protocols. The second layer is the TLS Hand-
shake Protocol that authenticates the client and server. It also permits negotiation
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of an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys before data is sent or received by
the application protocol.
TLS 1.0 was designed as an upgrade to SSL version 3.0 in 1999 by Christopher
Allen and Tim Dierks. TLS 1.0 weakened security by including a means through
which a TLS implementation could downgrade the connection to SSL 3.0. This dif-
ference prevents interoperability between the TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 protocols. TLS
1.1 was an upgrade of TLS 1.0 and was defined in 2006. This version added protec-
tion against poodle attacks. It replaced the implicit initialization vector (IV) with
explicit IV. TLS 1.2 was defined in 2008 as an upgrade to TLS 1.1. This version
introduced SHA-256 with an option of using a cipher-suite specified pseudorandom
function (PRFs). TLS 1.2 was enhanced with an ability to allow the client or server
to specify which hash and signature to accept. The version expanded the support for
authenticated encryption ciphers. A TLS 1.3 draft has been developed to improve
upon TLS 1.2.
The authentication process involves an SSL / TLS client sending a message to
the SSL / TLS server. The server, in turn, responds with the information that the
server needs to authenticate itself. Both the server and the client exchange session
keys, which marks the end of the dialog. In mutual SSL / TLS authentication,
both the client and server authenticate each other through digital certificates so
that both parties are assured of the other’s identity. The process of authenticating
and establishing an encrypted channel using certificate-based mutual authentication,
shown in Figure 3.5, involves the following steps:
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1. A client requests access to a protected resource.
2. The server presents its certificate to the client.
3. The client verifies the server’s certificate.
4. If successful, the client sends its certificate to the server.
5. The server verifies the client’s credentials.
6. If successful, the server grants access to the protected resource requested by the
client.
Figure 3.5: Mutual SSL / TLS Authentication Process
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Man-in-the-middle Attack
In 2009, Marlinspike created two tools called “sslstrip” [83] and “sslsni↵” [84] which
were presented at Black Hat DC [85]. These tools do not attack the SSL protocol
itself, but the transition from non-encrypted to encrypted communications. They
transparently hijack HTTP tra c on a network, watch for HTTPS links and redirects,
and then map those links into either look-alike HTTP links or homograph-similar
HTTPS links. Marlinspike was able to make use of the previously mentioned “Chain
of Trust” limitations and vulnerabilities by obtaining a valid digital certificate for
a legitimate URL that he owned, and then issued a new digital certificate to an
internal URL which he called “PayPal”. A fake PayPal link can be created and sent
to victims. When the fake PayPal link is used, the browser searches the chain of CAs
until it finds the trusted issuing CA which validated Marlinspike’s legitimate URL.
The browser then considers the fake PayPal link valid and proceeds. This allows any
attacker to read all data passing through by being a man-in-the-middle who acts as
the server for the client and acts as the client for the server, reading all data passing
through.
3.3 Attribute-Based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) refers to a mode of data security where information
is encoded for a particular user via various features like the country of residence of the
user. This type of encryption is secure because it is collusion-resistant [86]. In ABE,
ciphertexts and users’ keys are tagged with diverse descriptive characteristics. For a
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key to decode a certain ciphertext, the features of the user’s key and ciphertext must
correspond. This section will provide a brief history of ABE and will also discuss the
various types of ABEs and the strengths and weaknesses of this encryption method.
ABE is a relatively a new mode of information safety. Waters and Sahai [87]
were the pioneers of this system of data encryption. Later, other computer scientists
like Goyal [86] built on what Sahai and Waters had established. Sahai and Waters
developed an attribute-based encryption system that focused on the articulation of
access threshold guidelines [88]. Later, Goyal enhanced the e↵ectiveness of the system
by introducing a mechanism that made it possible for a private key to operate with
diverse attributes.
ABE can either be a key-policy (KP) or ciphertext-policy (CP). The di↵erence
between key-policy and ciphertext-policy encryption systems lies in the type of ci-
phertexts or secret keys attributed to the access guidelines [89]. In the KP-ABE,
the admission policies are related to secret attribute keys. In the CP-ABE, the ac-
cess policies are attributed to ciphertexts and both the sender and recipient have a
common secret key.
3.3.1 Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE)
In key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE), the correspondent labels the
ciphertexts with a collection of expressive attributes [90]. Conversely, a dependable
attribute authority generates the user key. This mode of data encryption is used
mostly in structured institutions that wish to conceal information from certain parties.
KP-ABE is frequently used in forensic investigations. The system helps to ensure
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that the forensic analysts have the right to use data that concerns only their areas of
investigation. Figure 3.6 below shows how KP-ABE systems work.
Figure 3.6: How KP-ABE Systems Work [2]
3.3.2 Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE)
In ciphertext-policy ABE systems, the sender sets the rules regarding the access of
varied attributes included in the ciphertext. The sender determines the receivers who
have the authority to decipher the ciphertext. In this system, the users have a col-
lection of attributes and the attribute authority issues matching secret attribute keys
to the appropriate users [91]. To decode a ciphertext, the attributes must correspond
to the admission guidelines associated to the ciphertext. Figure 3.7 below shows how
CP-ABE systems work.
Figure 3.7: How CP-ABE Systems Work [2]
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3.3.3 Attribute-Based Encryption Strengths
The main strength of attribute-based encryption is that it minimizes data loss in
the event of an attack. The encryption system makes it di cult for an attacker
to compromise the stored information [92]. Therefore, the user is guaranteed that
the data remains secure and accurate even after the attack. Another strength of
attribute-based encryption is that it helps to establish the missing link. Whenever the
duties of a user change, the ABE system changes his/her attributes. Therefore, ABE
systems ensure that a user does not access unauthorized information [93]. The system
guarantees the consistency of information access and safety of data by matching user
attributes with access policies.
3.3.4 Attribute-Based Encryption Weaknesses
In spite of the ABE system being an authoritative and promising technique, it is
associated with numerous shortcomings. The weaknesses include, but are not limited
to, ine ciency, key revocation and coordination challenges, and a lack of attribute
revocation methods. The opponents of attribute-based encryption systems claim
that the method is not e cient due to the nature of the decryption algorithm. The
decryption process demands “double pairings for each leaf of the access tree that is
matched by a private key attribute and at most one exponentiation for each node
along a path from such a leaf to the root” [94]. Besides ine ciency in the decryption
algorithm, an ABE system does not have attribute revocation techniques. There are
no mechanisms to determine the expiration date of the attributes. Consequently, it
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is di cult for the key authority to control or revoke attributes that are no longer in
use. Furthermore, it becomes challenging for some users to decrypt information when
they lack important private keys.
As stated above, an attribute-based encryption system does not have a mecha-
nism for key revocation. The system does not allow a sender to determine whether
the receiver has been withdrawn. Moreover, numerous recipients may have identical
decryption policies, making it di cult for the key authority to determine the correct
key to retract [95]. The fact that multiple users may have similar decryption poli-
cies makes it challenging for the ABE system to have an e cient key coordination
technique. The current ABE system uses attributes that do not support numerical
values. Furthermore, the access policies do not execute integer assessments. Hence,
it is challenging for the system to e ciently manage users’ keys.
Numerous factors a↵ect the performance of attribute-based encryption systems.
They include the security level, number of attributes, and the quality of the device
being used. The execution time of ABE relies on the number of attributes [96]. On
average, the ABE encryption operation takes about four seconds. On the other hand,
the key generation process takes about two seconds. An increase in security level re-
sults in an increase in execution time. The attribute-based encryption system involves
a pairing calculation that helps to match private keys with particular attributes.
The system entails various operations. They include encryption, key generation,
and decryption operations [97]. Encryption is comprised of an algorithm that trans-
forms a message, public parameters, and a collection of attributes into ciphertexts.
The key generation process constitutes an algorithm that uses public parameters, a
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master key, and an access structure to generate the decryption key. On the other
hand, the decryption operation consists of an algorithm that uses the decryption key
to decode a ciphertext to obtain the original message. The operations of attribute-
based encryption are complex in that they entail trade-o↵s according to private key
sizes and ciphertexts [98]. Additionally, the operations entail exponentiations that
depend on the number of attributes.
3.4 Hash Functions
A hash function takes a variable string of characters and turns it into a fixed length
string called the digest. It is used to preserve data integrity either where the data
is stored or when it is traveling through computer networks. Cryptographic hash
functions are non-invertible (1-way), which means that given a hash value, one cannot
find the original message. The simplest hash function is one that takes any string and
returns a 1 if the input has an even number of characters or a 0 otherwise. The main
application of the hash function is to promote integrity. Messages or hash values
are verified to ensure that no unauthorized modifications have occurred. Integrity
is a necessary quality of any organization’s sensitive data. The integrity verification
involves comparing the hash values before sending and after any event that occurs.
Digital signatures make use of cryptographic hash functions to verify the validity of
hashed messages before being signed.
The problem with this hash function is that two di↵erent messages can produce
the same digest. This is called a collision. To correct the problem, many popular
and more useful cryptographic hash functions have emerged. The security strength
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of cryptographic hash functions is evaluated using its collision resistance, properties
needed by the application, and preimage resistance. If it is di cult to create a
collision, then the hash function becomes collision resistant [5]. The following is an
explanation of the hash functions adopted in recent history, as well an overview of
their advantages and disadvantages.
3.4.1 Message Digest, Version 5 (MD5)
MD5 is a message digest algorithm developed in 1991 by Ronald Rivest. MD5 works
through a series of steps. The input is first divided into blocks of 512 bits each. At
the end of the final block, 64 bits are added. All blocks are separated into 16 words
containing 32 bits each. Processing of the blocks then follows, which involves mixing
bu↵ers with words from the input for a specific number of rounds. The final output
of size 128 bits is produced after all rounds are complete.
The algorithm used by MD5 for computation is fast and therefore high speed
is achieved in this method. Also, collision resistance was considered the algorithm’s
main strength. Moreover, MD5 is popularly known and thus receives wide application
and acceptance. Furthermore, it makes use of a one-way hash, making it di cult to
reverse the process. However, several flaws and vulnerabilities in MD5 give threats a
chance to exploit the system. In 2005, Wang and Yu [99] showed that it is theoretically
possible to find hash collisions in MD5 and other hash functions. In 2007, Stevens et
al. [100] were able to construct two X.509 certificates [101] with di↵erent name fields
which have identical digital signatures. Later, in 2009, it was estimated to take one
day to complete an MD5 collision using a cluster of PlayStation 3 consoles [102].
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A malware called “Flame” was discovered in 2012 [103] [104], which was used
to attack Middle Eastern Governments’ computers running Microsoft Windows for
several years. Flame exploited the weaknesses in MD5 to fake a Microsoft digital
signature in order to gather data files, remotely change settings on computers, turn
on computer microphones to record conversations, take screen shots, and copy instant
messaging chats [105]. It is believed that Flame had been operational for five years
before it was discovered.
In 2014, McHugh [106] was able to come up with two PHP scripts which behave
di↵erently but have the same MD5 hash. He edited a PHP script with a subtle
di↵erence in the first chunks of binary data. This produced the same MD5 hash
when passed though the whole MD5 algorithm, including padding. Afterwards, he
was able to create a chosen prefix collision attack to come up with two totally di↵erent
images which have exactly the same MD5 hash [107]. A few weeks later, McHugh
was able to find a third image which had exactly the same MD5 hash [108]. As a
result, attackers can create many input sources which map to the same hash value
through the collision weakness. MD5 security is highly compromised and hence is
not recommended for use in securing a system or sensitive data.
3.4.2 Secure Hash Algorithm, Version 0 (SHA-0)
The requirements of SHA-0 were established in 1993 and the algorithm was subse-
quently utilized by the NSA. It was later revised in 1995. The SHA-0 algorithm
receives a message (input) of size of <= 264 bits. The input undergoes several trans-
formations or rounds where the bits are altered. The final output is a message digest
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of 160-bits. SHA-0 has weaknesses associated with its vulnerability to attacks. The
attacks were due to the existence of flaws in the initial code. Moreover, the algorithm
faces collision issues.
In 1998, the first collision attack was announced, and it was shown that collisions
were evident in 261 processes [109]. Later, in 2005, another attack was announced that
established collisions in 236 processes [110]. In 2005, SHA-0 was termed inappropriate
for application in any cryptography transaction [111]. More attacks were announced
afterwards. In 2008, it was announced that SHA-0 collisions could be found in about
one hour using a standard PC [112]. The recent attacks are classified as existential
forgery [113]. As a result, any application of the SHA-0 algorithm is not recommended
because of its vulnerability to attacks.
3.4.3 Secure Hash Algorithm, Version 1 (SHA-1)
SHA-1, a revision of the much weaker SHA-0, is similar in principle to MD5, but
with a more conservative implementation. It was published in 1995 by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The algorithm was di↵erent from
SHA-0 in that the message schedule became complex. However, the round function
of the two algorithms was similar. NSA revised the SHA-0 to SHA-1 with the intent
to correct the errors of the SHA-0 algorithm.
The SHA-1 algorithm begins by creating sub-registers of the initial 160-bit regis-
ter. It then proceeds through a sequence of iteration of the individual 512-bit message
digest. A series of rounds relating to four intervals then follows. Twenty iterations
are involved in the process with the input and blocks being operated by the rounds
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throughout. After the rounds, the other 160-bit register is included in the initial
160-bit register. The outcome for SHA-1 is a 160-bit hash value.
There have been several attacks against SHA-1. The first attack was announced
in early 2005, which explained a theoretical attack to find collisions in 280 opera-
tions [114]. In the same year, collisions were witnessed in 269 processes [115]. In
2013, Microsoft announced that it will not accept SSL certificates using SHA1 after
January 1st, 2017 [116] [117]. The SHA-1 algorithm was fully broken in February
2015 after researchers concluded that they found collisions in the algorithm [118].
The developers immediately concluded that use of the algorithm was not advised.
3.4.4 Secure Hash Algorithm, Version 2 (SHA-2)
The SHA-2 algorithms were introduced in 2001 as a draft and were approved in
2002 [119]. Several changes and updates to SHA-2 were published in 2004, 2008,
2011, and 2012. SHA-2 is a family of four similar hash functions with varying digest
lengths: SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-256 and SHA-512. The SHA-2 algorithm accepts
input with 64-bit or 128-bit sizes. Three operations take place in the SHA-2 algorithm.
They include right rotation and exclusive and modular addition. The output message
digest (hash) size can be 224, 256, 384, or 512 bits, according to the SHA-2 version
used.
The algorithm is not compatible with the older versions of browsers and other
applications. For instance, early versions of Windows like XP are not compatible
with this algorithm. As a result, the SHA-2 algorithm has not achieved a wide
application. Moreover, the SHA-2 application gives rise to problems in websites.
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Many customers make use of the algorithm although they may face the associated
compatibility issues.
In 2009, a pre-image attack on 46 steps of the hash function, which employed
the meet-in-the-middle technique, was published [120]. Indesteege et al. [121], as
well as Sanadhya and Sarkar [122], published a 24 steps practical collision attack on
the SHA-512 hash function. Last year, Dobraunig et al. [123] were able to practi-
cally demonstrate collision examples in SHA-2. Adoption of the algorithm has been
challenging, although advancements are being designed and tested to ensure that all
future attacks are prevented.
The need for an alternative algorithm led to the establishment of SHA-3. In late
2012, NIST announced that Bertoni et al. [124] won the SHA-3 competition. NIST
released the final standard version of SHA-3 in August 2015 [125]. The algorithm is
di↵erent from SHA-0 and SHA-2 in that its design is unique. It employs a sponge
construction design, wherein data is absorbed, and then the output is squeezed out
and has an arbitrary size [124]. The new SHA-3 is assumed to be secure and it is
hoped that the arbitrary size message digest can stop, or slow, collision attacks.
3.5 Trapdoor Hash Functions
A trapdoor hash function [126] is a collision resistant hash function with a trapdoor
(a secret key) for finding collisions. The concept of a trapdoor hash function was
originally derived from the notion of trapdoor commitments proposed by Brassard et
al. [127]. More formally, a trapdoor hashing scheme TH consists of the tuple (ParGen,
KeyGen, TH, TrapColGen), which is described next.
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ParGen: A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm for parameter generation
that takes a security parameter 1  as input and outputs system public param-
eters params.
KeyGen: A PPT key generation algorithm that takes params as input and outputs a
trapdoor and hash key pair (TK,HK).
TH : A trapdoor hash function that takes params, HK, a message m, and a random
element r as inputs and outputs the digest of m denoted as THHK(m, r).
TrapColGen: A collision-finding algorithm that takes params, TK, m, r, and an
additional message m0 6= m as inputs and outputs a collision parameter r0 such
that THHK(m, r) = THHK(m0, r0).
Figure 3.8 [128] shows the computation of the trapdoor hash of m to get a digest h,
along with the computation of the collision parameter r0 for m0, which, when used


















Figure 3.8: Single- and double- trapdoor hash functions. For the case of double-
trapdoor hash function, HK = (HKl, HKe) and HK 0 = (HKl, HK 0e)
Krawczyk et al. [126] used trapdoor hash functions (referred to as chameleon hash
functions) to construct a non-interactive non-transferable signature scheme, called
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chameleon signatures (closely related to undeniable signatures), under the hash-and-
sign paradigm. Chameleon signatures allow a signer to undeniably commit to the
contents of a signed document, but do not allow the recipient of the signature to
disclose the signer’s commitment to a third party without the signer’s consent. The
trapdoor hash function employed by Krawczyk et al. su↵ers from the key exposure
problem that allows anyone with the knowledge of a collision to compute the private
trapdoor key. Ateniese et al. [129] partially addressed this problem by introducing
an identity-based trapdoor hashing scheme that uses a new key pair for each collision
computation. Using this scheme, a collision only leads to the to the exposure of
a single trapdoor key that was used for computing that particular collision, thus
preventing the exposure from a↵ecting other collisions. Later, Chen et al. [130] and
Ateniese et al. [131] proposed full constructions of trapdoor hash functions without
key exposure, and provided several applications for trapdoor hashing. Additionally,
double-trapdoor hashing schemes were proposed [132], which, as the name suggests,
use pairs of hash keys, one long-term and the other ephemeral (or one-time).
In a double-trapdoor hashing scheme DTH, the trapdoor key TK now contains two
components (TKl, TKe), where TKl is long-term and TKe is ephemeral. Similarly,
the hash key is given as HK = (HKl, HKe). The trapdoor hash of a message is
computed in a fashion similar to conventional trapdoor hash functions, except that
the computation also uses the ephemeral component of the hash key. Di↵erences
in collision computation are more evident. In double trapdoor hashing schemes,
TrapColGen takes params, TK = (TKl, TKe), m, r, and an additional message
m0 6= m as inputs, and outputs a collision parameter r0 and HK 0 = (HKl, HK 0e) such
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that THHK(m, r) = THHK0(m0, r0). Analogous to single-trapdoor hashing schemes,
in double-trapdoor hashing schemes, computing the digest of a message using TH and
collisions using TrapColGen must be achievable in polynomial time. The function
TH is said to be part of a double-trapdoor hash family T H described by params,
where each TH is associated with a hash key HK = (HKl, HKe).
Similar notions for collision and key-exposure resistance also exist for trapdoor
hash functions that use ephemeral (or double) trapdoors [132]. Informally, colli-
sion forgery resistance implies that given params and HK = (HKl, HKe), it is
computationally infeasible to find a tuple hm, r,HK,m0, r0, HK 0i, where HK 0 =
(HKl, HK 0e) and THHK(m, r) = THHK0(m
0, r0). Key-exposure resistance implies
that given params and a tuple hm, r,HK,m0, r0, HK 0i, such that THHK(m, r) =
THHK0(m0, r0), it is computationally infeasible to find the long-term trapdoor key,
TKl corresponding to HKl. Figure 3.8 shows the operation of a double trapdoor
hash function. The function hashes a message m to get a digest h. During collision
computation with a message m0, the function outputs a collision parameter r0 and an
ephemeral hash key HK 0, which, when used for computing the trapdoor hash of m0,
lead to the same digest h.
For a trapdoor hash function to be practical, computing the digest of a mes-
sage using TH, and collisions using TrapColGen, must be achievable in polynomial
time. The function TH is said to be part of a trapdoor hash family T H described by
params, where each TH is associated to a hash key HK. Well-known security notions
associated with trapdoor hashing schemes include collision forgery resistance and
key-exposure resistance [126] [131] [133]. Collision forgery resistance [126] [133] im-
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plies that given params and HK, it is computationally infeasible to find a tuple
hm,m0, r, r0i such that THHK(m, r) = THHK(m0, r0). Key-exposure resistance [131]
implies that given system parameters, params and a tuple hm,m0, r, r0, HKi such that
THHK(m, r) = THHK(m0, r0), it is computationally infeasible to find the trapdoor
key TK corresponding to HK.
Trapdoor hash functions find applications in the development of several novel
signature schemes that include chameleon [126], online/o✏ine [133], threshold [132],
proxy [134] [135], sanitizable [136] [137], and amortized [138] signatures. More re-
cently, Chandrasekhar et al. [139] introduced the concept of multi-trapdoor hash
functions, which allow multiple entities to compute a collision with a given trapdoor
hash value, with applications in query authentication of cloud-based storage systems
involving multiple entities [140] and aggregate signcryption schemes [128].
3.6 Proxy Signatures
The concept of a proxy signature was introduced by Mambo et al. [141] in 1996. Proxy
delegation is a process by which an entity, the delegator, transfers its signing rights
and capabilities to another entity, the proxy. Following delegation, the proxy can
generate signatures, called proxy signatures, on behalf of the delegator. Mambo et
al. [141] classified proxy delegation into partial delegation, full delegation and delega-
tion by warrant, presented possible constructions for proxy signatures, and provided
an informal security analysis. As opposed to full and partial delegation which require
a secure channel and absolute trust on the proxy, the delegation-by-warrant approach
eliminates these impractical requirements [142] [143]. This is typically done by using
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the warrant as a message space descriptor, and requiring all messages that the proxy
signs to comply with the warrant.
In a typical delegation-by-warrant, the delegator generates a signature on the war-
rant and sends the signed warrant to the proxy. The proxy generates signatures on
messages that comply with the warrant, and includes the signed warrant in the result-
ing proxy signatures. Any entity wanting to verify a proxy signature must check the
validity of the proxy signature as well as delegator’s signature on the warrant (indi-
cating the agreement on the signed message). Later classifications of proxy signatures
included partial delegation by warrant [144] and strong/weak proxy signatures [145].
Since the introduction of proxy signatures, researchers have focused on developing
new schemes that enhance the security and/or e ciency of previous schemes [146]
[147] [148] [149] [150] [151] and developing extension/variations of proxy signatures
[143]. Proxy signatures have been found to have numerous applications in distributed
systems, grid computing, mobile agent applications, etc. For an extensive list of
related work see [143]. More recently, researchers have focused on formal security
notions for proxy signatures, as well as on the development of provably secure proxy
signatures [143] [152] [153].
Chandrasekhar et al. [134] proposed a technique to construct proxy signatures
using trapdoor hashes, along with a specific discrete log-based scheme that improves
upon prior schemes in terms of complexity, security, and e ciency. The technique
for generating proxy signatures using trapdoor hashes is as follows. The delegator
generates a trapdoor hash of the warrant, signs the hashed warrant, and sends the
(warrant, signature) pair to the proxy over an insecure channel. The proxy does not
77
generate a signature on the chosen message in the traditional sense on behalf of the
delegator. Instead the proxy uses its trapdoor key, known exclusively to itself, to find
a collision between the trapdoor hash of the warrant and the given message. The
proxy tags the result of the collision along with the delegators signature, warrant and
message to collectively generate the proxy signature. The technique guarantees strong
unforgeability, verifiability, strong identifiability, strong undeniability, and prevention
of misuse [134].
More formally, a trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme TPS is the tuple
(ParGen, KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer , hDelegate, Accepti, PSigGen, PSigVer) that is
described as follows:
ParGen: A PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter 1  as input and outputs
system public parameters params.
KeyGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params as input and outputs a (private, public)
key pair (SK,PK) and a (trapdoor, hash) key pair (TK,HK).
SigGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params, SK, and a message mp as inputs and
outputs a signature   on mp.
SigVer : A deterministic algorithm that takes params, PK,   and mp as inputs and
outputs Valid if   was generated on mp using SK and Invalid otherwise.
Delegate, Accept : A pair of interactive algorithms for proxy delegation that are de-
fined as follows:
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Delegate: A PPT algorithm that takes params, SK, and a warrant w (that
contains a message space descriptor as defined in [143] along with the
identities of delegator and proxy) as inputs, and computes a delegation
certificate cert containing the following: (1) A random element r; (2) A
signature   generated using SK on THHK(w, r). Delegate has no local
output. Delegate will interact with Accept for delegation of signing rights.
Accept : A deterministic algorithm that takes params, cert, w, PK and HK as
input, and outputs hValid , certi if: (1) w conforms to agreement between
delegator and proxy, and (2)   is a valid signature on THHK(w, r) under
PK; and hInvalid ,?i otherwise.
PSigGen: A PPT proxy signature generation algorithm that takes params, cert,
w, a message m, and TK as inputs and outputs a proxy signature  P =
hcert, r0, HK 0i onm complying with warrant w, where THHK(w, r) = THHK0(m, r0).
PSigVer : A deterministic algorithm that takes params, PK, HK, w, m and  P as
inputs and outputs Valid if: (1) Accept(params, cert, w, PK, HK) returns
hValid , certi; (2) m complies with w, and (3) THHK(w, r) = THHK0(m, r0);
and hInvalid ,?i otherwise.
Copyright c  Ahmed Fouad Shedeed Ibrahim, 2016.
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Chapter 4 A Secure Solution to Maintain Patients’ Privacy in Health
Information Exchange
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the development of a secure solution for
HIE that ensures patients’ privacy. The solution enables patients, at a healthcare
organization, to retrieve their health information, in entirety or partially, from a re-
mote healthcare organization. It allows the healthcare organization holding the health
information to authenticate patients and requesting healthcare organizations before
processing an information exchange request. The proposed HIE solution would allow
patients to authorize the requesting healthcare organizations to retrieve certain type
of health information (e.g., Cardiovascular) located at their home healthcare organi-
zation. Requested health information is encrypted using a symmetric key generated
simultaneously at the involved healthcare organizations and sent to the requesting
healthcare organization.
In Section 4.1, the system model for the solution is presented. Section 4.2 discusses
the protocol to exchange health information while maintaining patients’ privacy. The
security analysis of the privacy protocol is discussed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4
describes the evaluation of the message exchange overhead in the protocol.
4.1 The System Model
This section presents the conceptual model of the HIE privacy system and describes
the representation and organization of the system. The general architecture, shown
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in Figure 4.1, consists of three main elements: the National Medical Certification
Authority (NMCA), Healthcare Organizations (HCOs), and Patients. The structure
and capabilities of the National Medical Certification Authority (NMCA) are de-
scribed and discussed in subsection 4.1.1. Healthcare organizations’ structure and
capabilities are described and discussed in subsection 4.1.2.
Figure 4.1: The General Architecture for the HIE Privacy Solution
4.1.1 National Medical Certification Authority (NMCA)
The NMCA infrastructure, shown in Figure 4.2, consists of:
• A registration authority (RA) that acts as the verifier for the certificate author-
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ity before a digital certificate is issued to a requestor.
• A certificate authority (CA) that issues and verifies X.509 digital certificates.
• X.509 digital certificates which contains identity information of entities.
• A certificate repository database where the digital certificates are stored.
• A certificate checker that runs the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [154]
for obtaining the revocation status of issued digital certificates.
• A certificate management system which provides the tools for the NMCA to
perform.
Figure 4.2: The National Medical Certification Authority (NMCA) Components
The National Medical Certification Authority (NMCA) is capable of val-
idating legitimate healthcare providers and issuing X.509 digital certificates [101],
with all corresponding information for the registering HCO. For the highest level of
security, NMCA does not generate the public/private key pair for HCOs. Instead, the
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HCOs are required to submit a valid public key during their registration and must
store the corresponding private key in a highly secure place. The National Medical
Certification Authority (NMCA) issues X.509 digital certificates to each healthcare
organization (e.g., hospitals). The X.509 digital certificates is used by HCOs to es-
tablish authentication (discussed in subsection 4.2.1) before any patient or health












Certification Authority’s Digital Signature
Certificate Signature Algorithm
Figure 4.3: X.509 Digital Certificate Format; ⇤: Optional Fields
4.1.2 Healthcare Organizations (HCOs)
Healthcare organizations are the most important piece of the system model as they
retain patients’ EHRs as well as information about people treating those patients.
Each HCO’s system architecture consists of a communication gateway (CG), an inte-
gration system (IS), an EHR data system (DS), and an audit system (AS) as shown
83
in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Healthcare Organizations Architecture
The Communication Gateway (CG) stores the HCO digital certificate regis-
tered with the NMCA. It is responsible for establishing secure communication with
other HCOs. It handles mutual authentication with other HCOs, identifies patients,
sets the type of health information to retrieve, and performs message exchange. The
CG also updates the records in the audit system with corresponding actions.
The Integration System (IS) processes requests after the communication gate-
way completes the authentication process. On the sender side, it removes all of the
patient’s identity information from the requested EHRs of the requested type and
then integrates the remaining data into one medical information record. On the re-
ceiver side, it splits the medical information received back into separate EHRs and
adds the patient’s identity information (which the receiver has) back to the EHRs.
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The IS also updates the records in the audit system with corresponding actions.
The EHR Data System (DS) is responsible for running queries to retrieve se-
lected patients’ EHRs, adding new EHRs for patients, and handling internal encryp-
tion/decryption of stored EHRs.
The Audit System (AS) keeps a complete record for every incoming and out-
going request to ensure auditability in case of a breach. It receives data from the
communication gateway and the integration system to build complete transaction
logs. The audit system retains a log for all received records from the communica-
tion gateway and the integration system. Records are indexed using a Request
ID which is generated by the communication gateway. The Request ID is agreed
upon by the communication gateways for the HCOs involved in the process, using a
communication protocol discussed later.
4.2 The Proposed Protocol
The protocol specifies the set of rules and measures that govern the interactions
between the communicating entities in the system. This section describes the details
of the protocol developed to securely exchange certain types of health information
(e.g., Cardiovascular) for patient P from the current healthcare organization (Current)
to the new healthcare organization (New).
We assume that patients have valid existing credentials (username/password)
which they use for their accounts with every healthcare organization they use. Pa-
tients’ usernames at every healthcare organization are unique, which means that no
two patients have the same username. Also, each healthcare organization uses its
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own hash algorithm to store patients’ passwords. That is, healthcare organizations
do not have to change the system they already use for maintaining their patients’
credentials (username/password). Thus, any healthcare organization is eligible to
run the protocol presented in this section.
First, all healthcare organizations have to register with the NMCA and obtain
a valid digital certificate. Typically, when patient (P) is at a new healthcare or-
ganization (New) and wants to retrieve his/her health information, in entirety or
partially, from his/her current healthcare organization (Current), New and Cur-
rent exchange their digital certificates in order to authenticate each other. Both
HCOs verify the NMCA’s digital signature in received digital certificates and run
the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [154] with the NMCA to check the
validity of the certificate.
Also, the patient identifies the type of health information (HItype) to be exchanged
and then Current authenticates the patient and retains a digital consent for the
exchange request. Current prepares P’s health information of type HItype, encrypts
the health information using a symmetric key (simultaneously generated at both
HCOs) and then sends it to New.
Table 4.1 summarizes the notations used in the following sections of this chapter.
Subsection 4.2.1 presents the protocol’s mutual authentication, patient authentication
by Current, and symmetric key generation at both HCOs. The process of health
information preparation and exchange is discussed in Subsection 4.2.2.
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Table 4.1: Notations Used
Notation Description
P Patient
Current Healthcare Provider Holding Patient’s Health Information
New New Healthcare Provider where patient is currently present
HI Requested health information
HItype The type of requested health information
CurrentCG Communication Gateway at Current Healthcare Provider
NewCG Communication Gateway at New Healthcare Provider
CurrentIS Integration System at Current Healthcare Provider
NewIS Integration System at New Healthcare Provider
CurrentDS Data System at Current Healthcare Provider
NewDS Data System at New Healthcare Provider
CurrentAS Audit System at Current Healthcare Provider
NewAS Audit System at New Healthcare Provider
IDi Unique identifier for entity i (from digital certificate)
Kipr Private key for entity i (where i can be Current or New)
Kipu Public key for entity i (where i can be Current or New)
Ni Nonce issued by entity i (where i can be Current or New)
Mn Message with sequence number n
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
ReqID Request ID
P usernamei Patient’s username for entity i (where i can be Current or New)
PH(password)i Patient’s password hash for entity i (where i can be Current or New)
Halg Hash function algorithm used to store password hash
H() Cryptographic one-way hash function
Sigi(M) Signature of message M signed using entity i's private key
EK(M) Encrypting message M with key K
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4.2.1 Mutual Authentication & Simultaneous Key Generation
In this protocol, New begins the mutual authentication with Current, generates the
one-time symmetric key with CurrentCG simultaneously, and provides the patient’s
consent as follows:
1. NewCG generates a new request ID (ReqID), a fresh nonce (Nnew), and asks P
to enter its username (P usernamecurrent ) for Current (but does not save it). NewCG
creates a new record in the NewAS, indicating the outgoing request, and saves
the P usernamenew , ReqID, IDcurrent, and Nnew for this request. NewCG encrypts
(ReqID, IDnew, Nnew, and P usernamecurrent ) using CurrentCG’s public key K
current
pu
and sends it to CurrentCG as message M1 as follows:
New ! Current :M1
where M1 = EKcurrentpu (ReqID || IDnew ||Nnew || P usernamecurrent )
2. CurrentCG decrypts M1 using its private key Kcurrentpr to retrieve the ReqID,
Nnew, and P usernamecurrent . CurrentCG creates a new record in the CurrentAS,
indicating the incoming request, and saves the P usernamecurrent , ReqID, IDnew and
Nnew for this request. CurrentCG generates a fresh nonce Ncurrent, appends
it to the record at CurrentAS, then encrypts (ReqID, IDcurrent, Ncurrent, Nnew,
and the hash algorithmHalg it uses to store patients’ passwords) usingNewCG’s
public key Knewpu and sends it to NewCG as message M2 as follows:
Current! New :M2
where M2 = EKnewpu (ReqID || IDcurrent ||Ncurrent ||Nnew ||Halg)
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3. NewCG decrypts M2 using its private key Knewpr to retrieve ReqID, IDcurrent,
Ncurrent, Nnew, and Halg. The nonce Nnew, included in M2, authenticates
CurrentCG. NewCG appends the corresponding record in the NewAS with
Ncurrent. NewCG asks P to enter its password for Current and hashes it using
Halg to create (P
H(password)
current ) but does not save it. NewCG uses the nonce re-
ceived from Current along with the hash of the patient’s password to compute
the consent symmetric key Kcons as follows:
Kcons = (Ncurrent || PH(password)current )
NewCG then creates a digital consent Consent by encrypting the ReqID and
the health information type requested HItype using the consent key Kcons as
follows:
Consent = EKcons(ReqID ||HItype)
and appends the corresponding record in the NewAS with HItype. NewCG
sends the concatenations of: (1) the ReqID and the Ncurrent encrypted us-
ing CurrentCG’s public key Kcurrentpu and (2) the digital consent (Consent)
to CurrentCG as message M3 as follows:
New ! Current :M3
where M3 = EKcurrentpu (ReqID ||Ncurrent) || Consent
4. CurrentCG decrypts the first part of M3 using its private key Kcurrentpr . The
nonceNcurrent authenticatesNewCG as it was able to retrieve the nonce using its
private key. CurrentCG retrieves the stored hash of P’s password P
H(password)
current )
corresponding to Pusername to compute the consent symmetric key Kcons simul-
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taneously as follows:
Kcons = (Ncurrent || PH(password)current )
CurrentCG then decrypts the second part ofM3 using the consent key Kcons to
retrieve theHItype which the patient P authorizesNew to retrieve. CurrentCG
appends the corresponding record in the CurrentAS with HItype then sends the
P usernamecurrent and HItype to CurrentIS.
4.2.2 Health Information Retrieval (Exchange)
The protocol proceeds by preparing the requested health information type(s) and
performing the exchange as follows:
5. CurrentIS asks CurrentDS to prepare all Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
of type HItype belonging to P usernamecurrent .
6. CurrentDS queries all requested EHRs belonging to P currentID from its secure
database and sends them to CurrentIS.
7. CurrentIS removes P usernamecurrent and P’s personal information from the EHRs and
integrates the remaining parts in one health information record HI. CurrentIS
updates the corresponding record in theCurrentAS with the health information
record HI and then sends it to CurrentCG.
8. CurrentCG digitally signs the health information (Sigcurrent(HI)) for patient
P and updates the corresponding record in the CurrentAS with its signature.
CurrentCG then encrypts (ReqID, HI, and Sigcurrent(HI)) using Kcons and
sends it to NewCG as message M4 as follows:
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Current! New :M4
where M4 = EKcons(ReqID ||HI || Sigcurrent(HI))
9. NewCG decrypts M4 using the symmetric key Kcons and verifies the integrity
and authenticity of the received HI using the Sigcurrent(HI), updates the cor-
responding record in the CurrentAS with the HI and signature, then sends HI
to NewIS.
10. NewIS creates EHRs, including the patient personal information it has atNew,
from the received HI then sends the EHRs to NewDS.
11. NewDS stores the complete EHRs to be available for internal use.
Figure 4.5 shows the flow of the protocol. Notice that the patient username
(P usernamecurrent ) entered in step 1 and the password entered in step 3 are never stored at
the New healthcare organization. The Consent generated simultaneously at each
healthcare organization can be used for this session only, since the Consent depends
on Kcons which is calculated using the fresh nonce Ncurrent issued for this session by
Current. Also, the transferred health information reveals no personal information
whatsoever about the patient’s identity.
Upon completion of the protocol, both healthcare organizations have successfully
authenticated each other, and theCurrent healthcare organization has authenticated
Patient P and the type of health information requested. Current prepares the
requested health information of type HItype corresponding to P usernamecurrent and sends it
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Figure 4.5: Health Information Exchange Privacy Protocol Flow
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securely to Current.
The Audit System (AS) at every healthcare organization receives useful informa-
tion from the Communication Gateway (CG) and the Integration System (IS). The
AS at each communicating healthcare organization stores corresponding information
for every incoming/outgoing request ID (ReqID) for every communication to allow
the matching of records in NewAS and CurrentAS when needed.
A full record at NewAS is a tuple that includes the following:
“outgoing”, P usernamenew , ReqID, IDcurrent, Nnew, Ncurrent, HItype, HI, Sigcurrent(HI)
which can be read as an outgoing request number ReqID to IDcurrent to retrieve
P usernamenew ’s health information of type HItype. A full record at CurrentAS is a tuple
that includes the following:
“incoming”, P usernamecurrent , ReqID, IDnew, Nnew, Ncurrent, HItype, HI, Sigcurrent(HI)
which can be read as an incoming request number ReqID from IDnew to retrieve
P usernamecurrent ’s health information of type HItype.
4.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we describe the security features which our protocol provides to main-
tain patients’ privacy and comply with the technical safeguards of the HIPAA security
rule. The protocol is designed to provide mutual authentication between healthcare
organizations and patient authentication for current healthcare organizations. In ad-
dition, it allows only the health information of specified type (e.g., Cardiovascular) to
be exchanged according to the patient’s consent. It also prevents man-in-the-middle
attacks and can detect replayed messages.
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4.3.1 Validity of Certificates
Before authentication starts, communicating parties exchange their digital certificates
(issued by NMCA) and verify NMCA’s digital signature in received digital certificates.
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) [155] have traditionally been used to check the
validity of digital certificates. CRLs demonstrate a severe scalability problem as
directories grow large over time and pose communication delays [156]. Our protocol
uses the OCSP, as mentioned in subsection 4.2.1, rather than CRLs to check the
validity of certificates since the OCSP consumes less network bandwidth and enables
near real-time status checks even for high volume operations. Running the OCSP at
the start of communication will detect any invalid certificates.
4.3.2 Authentication
The protocol in our framework mutually authenticates communication parties before
preparing the patient’s EHR for exchange. At the beginning of the protocol, nonces
are exchanged between both parties to ensure that each party holds the private key
corresponding to their published public key at the time of authentication. New au-
thenticates Current when it validates that the Nnew received in step 3 (in subsection
4.2.1) matches the Nnew it generated and sent to Current in step 1 (in subsection
4.2.1). Current authenticates New when it validates that the Ncurrent received in
step 4 (in subsection 4.2.1) matches the Ncurrent it generated and sent to Home in
step 2 (in subsection 4.2.1). If any of the communicating party’s nonce validation
process fails, the authentication process fails and the protocol stops.
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Additionally, the protocol authenticates the patient to its current healthcare
provider using the patient’s assigned username and the stored hash of the patient’s
password. Current identifies the patient P who should be physically present atNew
when it receives Pusernamecurrent in message M1 and then sends the hash algorithm (Halg)
used to store P’s password to New. New asks P to enter the password for Current,
which is hashed using the hash algorithm received. The password entered by P is
never stored by New. The hash of P’s password (PH(password)current )) is then used by New
to compute Kcons as described in step 3 (in subsection 4.2.1) to create the patient’s
consent (Consent). In step 4, Current computes Kcons using the hash of P’s pass-
word (PH(password)current )) stored in its system. Current then uses Kcons to decrypt the
digital consent (Consent) in order to validate that the hash of the password used
at New matches the one stored in Current’s system. Current authenticates the
patient only after successfully decrypting the patient’s consent (Consent).
4.3.3 Authorization
The authorization requirement aims to ensure that the patient P has authorizedNew
to retrieve a certain type (e.g., Cardiovascular) of his/her own health information
from Home. No other type of health information should be exchanged other than
the type authorized by the patient. Both New and Current use the hash of the
patient’s password (PH(password)) and Current’s nonce (NCurrent) to compute KCons.
New creates the digital consent (Consent) by encrypting HItype using KCons. When
Current successfully decrypts the received digital consent (Consent) using KCons,
HItype implies the patient’s authorization for New to retrieve the patient’s health
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information of typeHItype only. In addition, the usage of NCurrent in computing KCons
guarantees that the authorization is only for the current request sinceCurrent knows
the nonce being used for each communication session.
4.3.4 Privacy
Our protocol maintains patient’s privacy in two ways. First, patients authorize a
certain type of health information (e.g. Cardiovascular) to be retrieved, which helps
prevent an undesired or unintentionally leakage of health information. Our protocol
uses KCons to encrypt the health information type (HItype), which forms a digital
consent (Consent) specifying the type of health information requested by the patient
physically at New. When Current decrypts Consent, it prepares only the patient’s
health information of type HItype and sends it back to New. No other type of health
information is sent to New other than the type authorized by the patient.
Second, the protocol does not link patients’ identity to their health information
during the transmission of the exchanged health information. When a patient’s health
information is prepared by Current, the Integration System (CurrentIS) removes
all patient identity information from the requested EHRs and then integrates the
remaining data into one health information record HI. As a result, the patient’s




To ensure the confidentiality of the health information (HI) during transmission,
the symmetric key KCons is used to encrypt M4 (Subsection 4.2.2). The symmet-
ric key KCons is computed using the hash of the patient’s password (P
H(password)
current )
and Current’s nonce (NCurrent), which is randomly generated by Current for each
communication session. The patient has a username and password which are used
when he/she wants to communicate with Current. Our protocol uses the username
(P usernamecurrent ) to identify the patient for the CurrentCG. The CurrentCG fetches the
hash of the patient’s password and then generates a fresh nonce and computes the
session key KCons as the concatenation of the patient’s hash of the password stored
in the system and the generated nonce.
TheCurrentCG sends the generated nonce to theNewCG in order for theNewCG
to be able to generate the same session key simultaneously, but does not send any
information about the patient (e.g., the hash of the password). After the NewCG
receives the nonce, it asks the patient to enter his/her password corresponding to
his/her account with Current. The NewCG hashes the patient’s password and
computes the session key KCons by concatenating the patient’s hash of the password
and the received nonce.
The password supplied by the patient in step 3 is used only to compute the
hash and is never stored by Current. Since both (PH(password)current and NCurrent) are
exchanged in an encrypted form, the symmetric key KCons is simultaneously generated
by Current andNew and is never exchanged. Thus, it is impossible for an adversary
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to find a key (KCons) that can successfully decrypt M4.
4.3.6 Integrity and Auditability
In this solution, the protocol checks the integrity of the requested health information
and can detect any possible alteration or distortion of information. Current com-
putes a signature (Sigcurrent(HI)) of the health information sent inM4. The integrity
of the retrieved HI in M4 is checked by New by comparing the hash of HI to the
hash in the signature attached. If they match, it proves the integrity of the health
information HI received.
Auditability is achieved in our framework by keeping records for all incoming
and outgoing exchange requests in the Audit System (AS) for each healthcare or-
ganization. The Audit System (AS) maintains adequate information (mentioned in
subsection 4.2.2) about each transaction which allows auditing at any time.
4.3.7 Man-in-the-middle Attacks (MITM)
In a man-in-the-middle attack (MIMT), an attacker impersonates each endpoint to
their satisfaction as expected from the legitimate other end. The attacker can simply
eavesdrop or secretly relay and alter the communication between the parties who
believe they are directly communicating with each other. A MITM attack on a
mutually authenticated connection can succeed only when the attacker can satisfy
each party’s authentication requirements while impersonating the other party. In
our protocol, MITM attacks are prevented because the HCOs first exchange digital
certificates issued and verified by the NMCA at the beginning of the protocol while
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the rest of the protocol is designed to detect and prevent such possible attacks.
After the HCOs validate received digital certificates, an attacker cannot alter mes-
sage M1 sent from a legitimate New because it is encrypted using Current’s public
key. If an attacker forges message M1 with an invalid ID for New, Current will
detect that New’s ID is invalid, discard that message, and stop the communication.
If an attacker forges message M1 with a fake nonce (Nattacker) instead of the original
Nnew, Current will send the fake nonce (Nattacker) to New in M2 which will detect
that the received Nattacker is invalid, discard that message, and stop the communi-
cation. If an attacker was able to prevent a legitimate message M1 from reaching
Current and tries to confuse Current by impersonating New by replaying message
M1 to Current, Current will send the reply (M2) back toNew becauseM1 includes
New’s ID and the attacker will gain no benefit.
Furthermore, an attacker cannot alter messageM2 sent from a legitimateCurrent
because it is encrypted using New’s public key. If an attacker forges message M2
with an invalid ID for Current, New will detect that Current’s ID is invalid, will
discard that message, and will stop the communication. If an attacker forges message
M2 with a fake nonce (Nattacker) instead of the original Ncurrent, New will send the
fake nonce (Nattacker) to Current in M3 which will detect that Nattacker received is
invalid, discard that message, and stop the communication. If an attacker was able
to prevent a legitimate message M2 from reaching New and tries to confuse New by
impersonating Current by replaying message M2 to New, New will send the reply
(M3) back to Current because M2 includes Current’s ID and the attacker will gain
no benefit.
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In case of an insider attack, where the attacker is using a legitimate HCO trying
to retrieve a patient’s health information, the attacker will not be able to proceed
beyond step 2 of the authentication process because the patient’s password is required
in order to compute the hash used to authenticate the patient.
In case of eavesdropping, an attacker capturing M1 and/or M2 will not gain any
useful information that can help in any future MITM attacks as both messages are
encrypted using the receiver’s public key. Also, if an attacker was able to spoof the
communication between New and Current after steps 1 and 2 to intercept M3, the
attacker will not be able to gain any information from the first part of M3 as it is
encrypted using Current’s public key and the second part Consent is encrypted
using KCons (the value of which the attacker has no knowledge). The same applies
for M4 as it is encrypted using KCons as well.
4.3.8 Replay Attacks
In our protocol, nonces are generated by the communicating parties and exchanged
for authentication as discussed in subsection 4.2.1. The nonces used in our protocol
also allow each party to detect a replayed message. If an attacker replays an older
message M1 to Current, Current will detect that the nonce Nnew received in M1
has already been used and will discard M1. If an attacker replays an older message
M2 to New, New will detect that the nonce Nnew received in M2 is not the same
as the one sent in M1 and will discard M2. Similarly, if an attacker replays an older
message M3 to Current, Current will detect that nonce Ncurrent received in M3 is
not the same as the one sent in M2 and will discard M3.
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Since the computation of KCons depends on Ncurrent and P
H(password)
current , the Consent
is unique for each request. This implies that Current can easily detect a replayed
messageM3 if the computed KCons does not successfully decrypt the Consent received
inM3. If an adversary or an insider tries to attach an older Consent to a legitimately
encrypted nonce Ncurrent inM3, Current will detect that KCons does not successfully
decrypt the Consent received in M3 which indicates that New is not legitimate, is
being compromised, or is trying to retrieve health information other than what it was
authorized to retrieve.
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of public/private key encryption used
in the protocol and the symmetric key encryption/decryption process on messages of
di↵erent size. A prototype was built using the Java SE Development Kit 8 with Java
Cryptography Architecture (JCA) and Java Cryptology Extension (JCE) libraries to
support the required cryptographic operations. We assume that each HCO ID (e.g.,
IDnew and IDcurrent), generated nonce (e.g., Nnew and Ncurrent), patient username, and
password hash is represented with 128-bits. The hash algorithm (Halg) is represented
with 8-bits and HItype is represented with 16-bits.
We identified the size of each message in the protocol and then ran the protocol
25 times to measure the maximum, minimum, and average execution times. We
used a machine with an Intel Quad Core 2.6GHz processor as our benchmark which
demonstrated that the protocol uses encryption/decryption techniques which boast
quick speeds.
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The well-known RSA public key cryptography algorithm was used to generate
2048-bit public-private keys for each healthcare organization. After running 25 en-
cryption processes of message M1’s payload (384-bits) using CurrentCG’s public key
Kcurrentpu (2048-bits), the minimum execution time was 125 milliseconds, the maxi-
mum execution time was 187 milliseconds, and the average execution time for the
25 runs was ⇡ 145 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.6. After running 25 decryption
processes on the encrypted M1 using CurrentCG’s private key Kcurrentpr (2048-bits),
the minimum execution time was 31 milliseconds, the maximum execution time was
62 milliseconds, and the average execution time for the 25 runs was ⇡ 41 milliseconds
as shown in Figure 4.7.
After running 25 encryption processes of message M2’s payload (392-bits) using
NewCG’s public key Knewpu (2048-bits), the minimum execution time was 125 millisec-
onds, the maximum execution time was 172 milliseconds, and the average execution
time for the 25 runs was ⇡ 146 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.8. After run-
ning 25 decryption processes on the encrypted M2 using NewCG’s private key Knewpr
(2048-bits), the minimum execution time was 31 milliseconds, the maximum execu-
tion time was 47 milliseconds, and the average execution time for the 25 runs was ⇡
36 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.9.
The concatenation of the password hash and nonce results in a consent key (KCons)
with a total length of 256-bits. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was used
for encryption/decryption using the generated 256-bit consent key. The encryption
process of message M3’s payload (144-bits) using CurrentCG’s public key Kcurrentpu
(2048-bits) to encrypt the Ncurrent and using KCons to encrypt the ReqID and HItype,
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Figure 4.6: M1 Encryption Execution Time
Figure 4.7: M1 Decryption Execution Time
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Figure 4.8: M2 Encryption Execution Time
Figure 4.9: M2 Decryption Execution Time
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the minimum execution time was 135 milliseconds, the maximum execution time was
235 milliseconds, and the average execution time for the 25 runs was ⇡ 164 mil-
liseconds as shown in Figure 4.10. After running 25 decryption processes on the en-
crypted M3 using the CurrentCG’s private key Kcurrentpr (2048-bits) and using KCons,
the minimum execution time was 32 milliseconds, the maximum execution time was
47 milliseconds, and the average execution time for the 25 runs was ⇡ 42 milliseconds
as shown in Figure 4.11.
The AES was used to encrypt/decrypt health information of sizes 1MB, 10MB,
50MB, 100MB, 500MB, and 1GB. After running 25 symmetric encryption processes
using KCons (simulating M4) on health information of size 1MB, the minimum execu-
tion time was 15 milliseconds, the maximum execution time was 47 milliseconds, and
the average execution time for the 25 runs was ⇡ 26 milliseconds as shown in Fig-
ure 4.12. After running 25 symmetric decryption processes using KCons (simulating
M4) on encrypted health information of size 1MB, the minimum execution time was
15 milliseconds, the maximum execution time was 16 milliseconds, and the average
execution time for the 25 runs was ⇡ 15 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.13.
After running 25 symmetric encryption processes using KCons (simulating M4) on
health information of size 10MB, the minimum execution time was 62 milliseconds,
the maximum execution time was 79 milliseconds, and the average execution time
for the 25 runs was ⇡ 69 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.12. After running 25
symmetric decryption processes using KCons (simulating M4) on encrypted health
information of size 10MB, the minimum execution time was 46 milliseconds, the
maximum execution time was 63 milliseconds, and the average execution time for the
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Figure 4.10: M3 Encryption Execution Time
Figure 4.11: M3 Decryption Execution Time
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25 runs was ⇡ 57 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.13.
After running 25 symmetric encryption processes using KCons (simulating M4) on
health information of size 50MB, the minimum execution time was 297 milliseconds,
the maximum execution time was 375 milliseconds, and the average execution time
for the 25 runs was ⇡ 320 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.12. After running 25
symmetric decryption processes using KCons (simulating M4) on encrypted health
information of size 50MB, the minimum execution time was 250 milliseconds, the
maximum execution time was 313 milliseconds, and the average execution time for
the 25 runs was ⇡ 264 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.13.
After running 25 symmetric encryption processes using KCons (simulating M4) on
health information of size 100MB, the minimum execution time was 625 milliseconds,
the maximum execution time was 922 milliseconds, and the average execution time
for the 25 runs was ⇡ 661 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.12. After running 25
symmetric decryption processes using KCons (simulating M4) on encrypted health
information of size 100MB, the minimum execution time was 500 milliseconds, the
maximum execution time was 812 milliseconds, and the average execution time for
the 25 runs was ⇡ 561 milliseconds as shown in Figure 4.13.
After running 25 symmetric encryption processes using KCons (simulating M4) on
health information of size 500MB, the minimum execution time was 3469 milliseconds
(3.469 seconds), the maximum execution time was 9871 milliseconds (9.871 seconds),
and the average execution time for the 25 runs was ⇡ 7196 milliseconds (7.196 sec-
onds) as shown in Figure 4.14. After running 25 symmetric decryption processes using
KCons (simulating M4) on encrypted health information of size 500MB, the minimum
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Figure 4.12: M4 Encryption Execution Times for 1MB, 10MB, 50MB, and 100MB of
Health Information
Figure 4.13: M4 Decryption Execution Times for 1MB, 10MB, 50MB, and 100MB of
Health Information
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Figure 4.14: M4 Encryption Execution Times for 500MB and 1GB of Health Infor-
mation
Figure 4.15: M4 Decryption Execution Times for 500MB and 1GB of Health Infor-
mation
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execution time was 3141 milliseconds (3.141 seconds), the maximum execution time
was 6256 milliseconds (6.256 seconds), and the average execution time for the 25 runs
was ⇡ 3871 milliseconds (3.871 seconds) as shown in Figure 4.15.
After running 25 symmetric encryption processes using KCons (simulating M4)
on health information of size 1GB, the minimum execution time was 11844 millisec-
onds (11.844 seconds), the maximum execution time was 17688 milliseconds (17.688
seconds), and the average execution time for the 25 runs was ⇡ 14736 milliseconds
(14.736 seconds) as shown in Figure 4.14. After running 25 symmetric decryption
processes using KCons (simulating M4) on encrypted health information of size 1GB,
the minimum execution time was 8437 milliseconds (8.437 seconds), the maximum
execution time was 15358 milliseconds (15.358 seconds), and the average execution
time for the 25 runs was ⇡ 11805 milliseconds (11.805 seconds) as shown in Figure
4.15.
Table 4.2 shows the minimum, maximum, and average execution times for en-
crypting and decrypting M1, M2, M3, and M4 (with 1MB Health Information). Ac-
cordingly, the expected minimum, maximum, and average execution times for the
protocol (excluding communication delays) are 509 milliseconds, 813 milliseconds,
and 615 milliseconds, respectively.
Using 2048-bit RSA keys ensures the infeasibility of cracking the cipher because it
requires factoring a 617-digit number which would take a standard desktop computer
6.4 quadrillion years. Brute-force attacks are impossible on AES with a 256-bit key
because they would require the generation of 1.1 x 1077 key combinations which would
require about 3.31 x 1056 years to crack the cipher. Thus, the communication will
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Table 4.2: Execution Times for Encrypting/Decrypting M1, M2, M3, and M4 (with
1MB Health Information)
Message Process Minimum Maximum Average
M1 (384-bits)
Encryption 125 ms 187 ms 145 ms
Decryption 31 ms 62 ms 41 ms
M2 (392-bits)
Encryption 125 ms 172 ms 146 ms
Decryption 31 ms 47 ms 36 ms
M3 (144-bits)
Encryption 135 ms 235 ms 164 ms
Decryption 32 ms 47 ms 42 ms
M4 (1MB HI)
Encryption 15 ms 47 ms 26 ms
Decryption 15 ms 16 ms 15 ms
maintain the privacy of the health information exchanged during each session as there
are no known attacks on RSA with 2048-bit keys or AES with 265-bit keys.
Also, table 4.3 shows a comparison between the four existing solutions [52] [54] [55] [57]
and our protocol according to several requirements/features. Compared to [52] [54] [55] [57],
our protocol avoids unnecessary requirements such as costly smart cards, patient
training, and the involvement of third parties. Unlike [52] [54] [55] [57], our pro-
tocol o↵ers patients the capability to specify the type of medical information to be
transferred.
Copyright c  Ahmed Fouad Shedeed Ibrahim, 2016.
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Table 4.3: Comparison of the proposed HIE privacy protocol with related protocols
Requirement/Feature [52] [54] [55] [57] Our HIE Privacy Protocol
Special hardware with patients Yes Yes No No No
Special hardware at HCPs Yes Yes No No No
Patient training N/A N/A Yes No No
Uses third parties Yes Yes Yes Yes (Trust Servers) No
Specifies medical info. type No No No Basic info. only Yes
Authenticates healthcare providers Home only Home only Digital Watermarking SSL Yes (Mutual)
Way of checking revocations CRLs N/A N/A CRLs OCSP
Authenticates patient Yes Yes N/A No Yes
Patient authentication way Digital Certificate Digital Certificate N/A N/A Username / Password
Medical info. encryption key type Asymmetric Asymmetric Blinded Committments Symmetric Symmetric
Medical information stored in Recordable Media Patients’ smartcard Home HCPs’ site Home HCPs’ site Home HCPs’ site
Number of message exchange N/A 9 N/A Number of hops + 2 4
Has audit controls Yes No No No Yes
Privacy preserving No Yes N/A No Yes
Provides adequate security analysis No No No No Yes
Prevents man-in-the-middle attacks No No No No Yes
Detects replay messages No No No No Yes
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Chapter 5 A Proxy-Signature-Based Access Control for Health
Information Exchange
Access control (or authorization) is a critical and integral requirement in the devel-
opment of a secure HIE. Given that the primary purpose of an HIE is the exchange
of health information, it is essential that a request for any such exchange contains
an explicit authorization to prevent any undesired or unintentional leakage of health
information. Moreover, the process of authorization must be accompanied by the
authentication of the entities making the access request. In this chapter, we address
the problem of enabling secure (authenticated and authorized) on-demand access to
patient records in a cloud-based HIE.
Existing methods of authorization in electronic health information systems can
be divided into cryptographic and non-cryptographic approaches [62] [157]. The
non-cryptographic approaches for authorization mainly focus on the development of
a policy-based authorization infrastructure, where access to health information is
governed by novel access control policies specifically developed to secure electronic
health information. The predominant access control model proposed in the majority
of existing literature is the role-based access control (RBAC) model [62]. However,
non-cryptographic approaches also elude the enforcement of the access control poli-
cies to standard o↵-the-shelf mechanisms or commercial standards that can be prone
to problems such as misconfiguration, policy corruption, forgery, and other technical
errors or limitations [62] [158]. Any use of the existing non-cryptographic approaches
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for secure health information access in HIEs requires an explicit and secure mecha-
nism for policy enforcement. To this end, cryptographic approaches provide just such
an explicit and secure mechanism for enforcing authorization. The primary crypto-
graphic approach for providing access control in health information systems is the
use of ABE [157]. Although ABE and its variants can be an e↵ective mechanism
for providing access control in HIE, they su↵er from several limitations [157]. Being
pairing-based, ABE-based schemes typically su↵er from significantly high computa-
tional overhead. In addition, ABE-based schemes can be limited in terms of specifying
access policies. ABE-based schemes also exhibit high complexity, which can lead to
implementation errors.
5.1 Objectives
The goal of this chapter is to address the issues with existing approaches for autho-
rization in health information systems, and to develop a simple, e↵ective, and e cient
protocol suitable for securing HIE access control. The authorization protocol fills the
gap between cryptographic and non-cryptographic approaches, with the former lack-
ing an explicit authorization enforcement mechanism that is cryptographically secure,
and the latter being complex, computationally expensive, and limited in policy speci-
fication. Moreover, rather than combining encryption with authorization, as has been
the method of most existing cryptographic approaches (ABE-based schemes), a more
universal approach is followed to combine authentication with authorization.
More specifically, we develop a secure and e cient trapdoor hashing scheme, and
employ it in a novel manner to construct a proxy signature-based protocol for authen-
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ticated and authorized on-demand access to patient records. The protocol facilitates
a patient-centric approach for controlling access to and exchange of a patient’s health
information in a selective manner that complies with policies agreed upon by health-
care providers and patients. The mechanism allows patients to authorize the sharing
of specific medical information with specific healthcare providers for a specific period
of time, which helps prevent any undesired or unintentional leakage of health informa-
tion. The scheme also ensures that such authorizations are authentic with respect to
both the healthcare providers and the patient, and comply with the established access
control policies. Moreover, the use of proxy signatures simplifies security auditing and
the process of obtaining support for investigations by providing non-repudiation. In
summary, the contributions of this Chapter are as follows:
1. Developing a novel discrete log-based trapdoor hashing scheme that is e cient
and secure against collision forgery and key-exposure.
2. Using the trapdoor hashing scheme to develop a novel proxy signature-based
protocol that enables authenticated and authorized selective sharing of patient
health information via a cloud-based HIE. The protocol exhibits several de-
sirable features that include non-interactive and on-demand operation, flexi-
ble specification of access control policies, audit support, and compliance with
agreements between healthcare providers and patients.
3. Performing a security analysis of the proposed protocol which shows that the
trapdoor hashing scheme is secure against collision forgery and key-exposure,
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and that the protocol is secure against forgery under the well-known discrete
log assumption.
4. Performing a performance analysis of the proposed protocol using the developed
trapdoor hash-based which shows that our proxy signature scheme achieves the
best all-round performance (while being provably secure) compared to other
well-known proxy signature schemes in the literature.
5.2 The System Model
This section describes the system model associated with the protocol for secure in-
formation access and exchange in HIE. The system consists of two main components:
the HIE cloud and healthcare organizations (HCOs) which o↵er health services to
patients as shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: HIE Access Control System Components
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5.2.1 The Health Information Exchange Cloud
The HIE cloud consists of the (layered) hardware and software components (such as
servers, storage, communication and virtualization software) that are used by various
HCOs for storing, sharing, processing, and managing healthcare data. The HIE cloud
is built as a hybrid cloud maintained by a (trusted) external cloud service provider
and the HCOs, and functions as the principal point of interaction between the patients
and various HCOs. It is assumed that the HIE cloud implements mechanisms that
allows for the integration and composition of data from disparate sources [159] into a
single uniform database. All patient data is maintained in an encrypted form during
storage using homomorphic or searchable schemes [157], while all communication is
secured using well-known mechanisms like the TLS protocol [62].
5.2.2 Healthcare Organizations
Any entity that o↵ers health services is considered an HCO. All HCOs generate
valid public-private key pairs, register with the HIE cloud, and obtain a valid digital
certificate. Each HCO has the appropriate tools to allow the processing and storing
patients’ health information in the HIE cloud and the ability to access patients’
health information created by other HCOs according to the access permissions given
by patients. Patients obtain their credentials from the HCO that first creates their
health information record. Patients’ devices (e.g., laptop or smart phone) contain all
the necessary software to communicate with various HCOs and the HIE cloud, and
to access and manage their health information.
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Patients also generate their public-private key pair and register with the HIE
cloud, obtaining valid certificates. The proposed authorization protocol is designed
to provide patients full control over access to their health information, which we
assume will be implemented as software components installed and maintained on the
patient-side, HCO-side, as well as the HIE cloud-side. Patients use their credentials to
grant access permissions to other HCOs and control the type of medical information
that each HCO is authorized to access.
It is assumed that both patients and HCOs have the necessary mechanisms to
support the use of public key cryptography. To support this, the HIE cloud imple-
ments a public key infrastructure (PKI) that validates legitimate HCOs and patients,
and issues X.509 digital certificates with all corresponding information for register-
ing HCOs and patients. The HIE cloud also implements the necessary revocation
mechanisms and maintains a publicly available directory to make the public keys and
certificates available to requesting entities.
The design of the protocol takes advantage of the way trapdoor hash-based proxy
signatures are generated, along with the use of a message space descriptor, in the form
of a warrant, that is used in the delegation process for controlling various parameters,
like the validity period, identities of delegator and proxy, message format, etc. The
current HCO of a patient wanting to share a patient’s health information, say Hc, acts
as a delegator and generates a standard signature on the trapdoor hash of a warrant,
along with some additional information, like its own and the patient’s identities.
This warrant acts as an authorization template that is used by the patient, acting as
a proxy, to specify the new HCO that needs to be granted access to patient data,
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say Hn, the validity period of the authorization, and the types of records that can be
accessed. To do this, the patient generates a trapdoor collision between the warrant
and these specific authorization parameters. This process, in e↵ect, is a legitimate
modification of the warrant into the authorization parameters without invalidating
the original HCO’s signature, and requires no interaction with the original HCO, Hc.
The resulting proxy signature on the authorization parameters, along with the HCO’s
signature on the warrant, act as an authorization certificate, which is then transferred
to Hn.
Now, Hn’s request to the HIE cloud for access to the patient records is accompa-
nied by this authorization certificate, which can be verified by the HIE cloud using
the public keys of the patient and Hc. A successful verification not only indicates
to the HIE cloud that Hn’s request is authorized by the patient, but also that this
authorization is in agreement with the patient’s current HCO, Hc. In this way, we
are able to provide an explicit mechanism for patients to authorize the sharing of
specific medical information with specific HCOs, which helps prevent any undesired
or unintentional leakage of health information. The protocol also ensures that such
authorizations are authentic with respect to both the current HCOHc and the patient
granting access.
The protocol governs the interaction between the various architectural compo-
nents and entities in direct and indirect ways to perform various tasks that can be
divided into three phases, namely initialization, certificate generation, and certificate
verification. We assume a patient P wanting to provide record access to a new HCO,
Hn with the cooperation of its current HCO Hc. For simplicity, it is assumed that
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the identities of patients and HCOs are unique and unforgeable.
In the initialization phase, all entities compute and agree on the common cryp-
tographic parameters, and generate and register their public keys. In the certificate
generation phase, P and Hc interact with each other to generate an authorization
certificate for Hn. Finally in the certificate verification phase, Hn presents the HIE
cloud with the authorization certificate as part of the request to access patient data,
followed by the HIE cloud verifying the certificate to check whether the authorization
is valid.
5.3 The Proposed Protocol: The Formal Description
Before describing the access control protocol for HIE systems, we present a secure
discrete log (DL)-based trapdoor hashing scheme, called DL-mDTH in Subsection 5.3.1.
The DL-mDTH is used to construct a proxy signature scheme-based protocol for se-
cure access and exchange of patient health information. Afterwards, we describe the
proposed protocol formally.
5.3.1 The DL-mDTH Trapdoor Hashing Scheme
Chandrasekhar et al. [128] [140] proposed an e cient DL-based instantiation of a
double-trapdoor hashing scheme, called DL-DTH, and also performed a detailed se-
curity analysis that proves the DL-DTH is secure against key-exposure and collision
forgery under the DL assumption. The DL-mDTH scheme is a variant of the DL-
DTH [128] [140] scheme that does not require use of a zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
edge (ZKPoK) for the secret ephemeral trapdoor key while maintaining security and
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e ciency of DL-DTH.
The common system public parameters of the DL-mDTH scheme are params = hp,
q, g, Hi, where p and q are primes such that q | (p  1), g is an element of order q in
Z⇤p and H : {0, 1}⇤ 7! Z⇤q is a cryptographic hash function. The long-term trapdoor
and hash key pair of an entity is (TKl, HKl) = (y 2R Z⇤q, Y = gy 2 Z⇤p), and the
ephemeral trapdoor and hash key pair of an entity is (TKe, HKe) = (z 2R Z⇤q, Z =
gz 2 Z⇤p). An entity generates a trapdoor hash of a message m 2 {0, 1}⇤ using the
hash key HK = (Y, Z) by choosing an element r 2R Z⇤q and computing the hash
as THHK(m, r) = gH(m||Y ||Z)(Y Z)r mod q. Given system parameters params the
trapdoor key TK = (y, z), message m 2 {0, 1}⇤, r 2 Z⇤q and an additional message
m0( 6= m) 2 {0, 1}⇤, an entity computes a collision as follows:
1. Chooses an ephemeral trapdoor key z0 2R Z⇤q and computes the corresponding
ephemeral hash key Z 0 = gz0 mod q.
2. Computes r0 by solving r0 = y + z0 1(H(m||Y ||Z)   H(m0||Y ||Z 0) + (y + z)r)
mod q.
3. Outputs hr0, HK 0 = (Y, Z 0)i, such that gH(m||Y ||Z)(Y Z)r = gH(m0||Y ||Z0)(Y Z 0)r0
In Section 5.4, a detailed security analysis of the proposed DL-mDTH trapdoor hashing
scheme is presented, proving its resistance to collision forgery and key exposure.
5.3.2 Initialization Phase of the Protocol
The initialization phase begins with all entities choosing and agreeing on the com-
mon system public parameters params = hp, q, g,H,Gi, where p, q, g, and H are
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as described in subsection 5.3.1 for the DL-mDTH scheme, along with an additional
cryptographic hash function G : {0, 1}⇤ 7! Z⇤q. Each HCO chooses its long-term
private (signing) key x 2R Z⇤q and computes the corresponding long-term public key
as X = gx 2 Z⇤p. In addition, each patient P chooses his/her long-term trapdoor
key TK = (y, z), where y, z 2R Z⇤q, and computes the corresponding long-term hash
key HK = (Y, Z), where Y = gy mod p and Z = gz mod p. As mentioned in
Section 5.2, we assume the existence of a public key infrastructure where all public
keys are published in a publicly available directory, with certificates that identify and
validate key ownership.
5.3.3 Certificate Generation Phase of the Protocol
In this phase, a patient P interacts with its current HCO, Hc, to generate an au-
thorization certificate that will allow a new HCO, Hn, to access P ’s records from
the HIE cloud. The process begins with the patient P requesting Hc for a signed
authorization template to allow P to grant Hn access to his/her health information.
Upon receiving this request, Hc creates a message M .
M is partitioned into the following two parts: a) the component m that contains
the identities of the current HCO and patient, and b) the message space descriptor
(warrant) mw that serves as an authorization template. Figure 5.2 shows the for-
mat of Message M . The patient uses this warrant to fill in the remaining parameters
(fields) pertaining to the desired authorization, which include the new HCO’s identity,
type(s) of records that can be accessed, and the validity period for the authorization.
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Figure 5.2: Message M Format
The HCO Hn retrieves the long-term trapdoor hash key pair HK = (Y, Z) of the
patient P and generates a signed authorization template (contained within M) as
follows:
1. Chooses a k 2R Z⇤q and computes K = gk mod p, where (k,K) are used as the
ephemeral (private, public) key pair for Hc’s signature on M .
2. Computes hw = H(mw||Y ||Z) and r = K mod q, and generates the trapdoor
hash on mw as thw = THHK(mw, r) = ghw(Y Z)r mod q.
3. Computes h = G(M ||thw||K) and solves for t in t ⌘ k+xh mod q (Schnorr [160]-
type signing).
4. Creates the signed authorization template AT = hM,  i, where   = ht, hi, and
sends AT to P .
After receiving the signed authorization template AT , the patient P retrieves the
long-term public key X of Hc, verifies Hc’s signature   onM (containing the warrant)
under X, and generates an authorization certificate as follows:
5. Parses M as (m||mw), and computes K = gtX h mod p, r = K mod q, hw =
H(mw||Y ||Z), and thw = ghw+(y+z)r mod q.
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6. Checks whether h = G(M ||thw||K), and if so,   is a valid signature by Hc on
M .
7. Generates the authorization parameters mp = (Hn||mtype||period) complying
with mw.
8. Chooses an ephemeral trapdoor key z0 2R Z⇤q and computes the corresponding
ephemeral hash key Z 0 = gz0 mod p.
9. Computes hp = H(mp||Y ||Z 0) and solves for r0 in r0 = (y+ z0) 1(hw hp+(y+
z)r) mod q, resulting in a collision between the trapdoor hashes of the warrant




10. Generates the authorization certificate AC = hM 0,  P i, where  P = ht, h, r0, hpi
and M 0 =M ||mp, and sends AC to Hn.
We observe that after generating an authorization certificate AC for an HCO Hn,
the patient can store the authorization template AT to grant authorizations to other
HCOs, or modify existing authorizations for a previously authorized HCO. The pa-
tient generates new (or modifies existing) authorization certificates simply by creating
new authorization parameters m0p and computing a trapdoor hash collision with mw
(following steps 7 - 10). The patient need not re-verify   (using steps 5 and 6), which
provides significant savings in computational costs.
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5.3.4 Certificate Verification Phase of the Protocol
After receiving the authorization certificate AC from the patient, Hn sends a request
to the HIE cloud for access to the patient records by attaching AC to the request.
The HIE cloud retrieves the long-term public key X of Hc and long-term hash key
(Y, Z) of P , and verifies Hn’s authorization as follows:
11. Parses M 0 as (m||mw||mp) and  P as ht, h, r0, hpi, and checks whether mp com-
plies with mw.
12. Computes K = gtX h mod p, r = K mod q, hw = H(mw||Y ||Z), and thw =
ghw(Y Z)r mod q.
13. Checks whether h = G(M ||thw||K), and if so,   is a valid signature by Hc on
M .
14. Computes Z 0 = Y  1(g(hw hp)r0 1(Y Z)rr0 1) mod p and checks whether hp =
H(mp||Y ||Z 0). If so, then the authentication parameters are valid.
The new HCO Hn now has access to the patient P ’s records created by Hc of type
mtype for a period of time (period). Once again, just as a patient can re-use a signed
authorization template to save on computation, the HIE cloud can also save the
signed authorization template and avoid the cost of re-verifying Hc’s signature on
the warrant. Every time the HIE cloud receives a new authorization certificate A0C
generated by the same combination of Hc and P , the HIE cloud can simply compare
the t and h parameters in A0C with those in the previously received AC , and, in case
of a match, executes step 14 to verify the collision between trapdoor hashes of the
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warrant and the new authorization parameters. Figure 5.3 shows the flow of the HIE
access control protocol.
5.4 Security Analysis
This section provides a detailed security analysis of the DL-based double trapdoor
hashing scheme DL-mDTH and the resulting protocol for secure (authenticated and
authorized) access and exchange of patient health information.
The di culty of forging collisions and key exposure in DL-mDTH and the security
of the proposed authorization protocol are based on the di culty of solving the well-
known discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in group Z⇤p [134]. We begin by proving the
following two theorems that establish the security of DL-DTH.
Theorem 1 The trapdoor hashing scheme DL-mDTH [cf. subsection 5.3.1] is collision-
forgery-resistant.
Proof: We prove the forgery resistance property of the proposed trapdoor hash-
ing scheme by showing that the discrete log problem in group Z⇤p reduces to collision
forgery, thus violating the well known discrete log assumption.
Assume that there exists a PPT collision forger F against the proposed trap-
door hashing scheme with non-negligible advantage. Given a hash key HK = (Y, Z)
and parameters hp, q,↵, H,Gi, F runs in polynomial time and outputs the tuple
hm, r,m0, r0, HK 0i, where HK 0 = (Y, Z 0), such that m 6= m0, r 6= r0, and h =
THHK(m, r) = THHK0(m0, r0) with non-negligible probability. Given F , we can
construct a PPT algorithm D that breaks the subgroup DLP assumption [134] as
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Figure 5.3: HIE Access Control Protocol Flow
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follows. D is given a DLP instance hp, q, g, Y i. D needs to find y 2 Z⇤q such that
Y = gy mod p. The hash function H behaves as a random oracle OH that D simu-
lates. This means that D answers any hash queries to OH with a random value for
each new query [161] (with identical answers if the same query is asked twice). For
instance when F queries OH with hmi, where D returns h if 9h such that h = H(m).
Otherwise D chooses h 2R Z⇤q, sets H(m) = h (i.e., stores h as the hash entry for
H(m)), and returns h to F .
D chooses z 2R Z⇤q, computes Z = gz mod p and sets HK = (Y, Z). D then
runs an instance of forger F with HK as input, answering any hash queries to OH ,
until F produces the collision forgery hm, r,m0, r0, HK 0i, where HK 0 = (Y, Z 0), and
gH(m||Y ||Z)(Y Z)r = gH(m0||Y ||Z0)(Y Z 0)r0 mod q. Let h0 be the response D gave when F
made the query hm0||Y ||Z 0i to OH . Using the oracle replay attack [161], D rewinds
F to the point when F made the query, hm0||Y ||Z 0i to OH , and gives F a new
randomly chosen value h00 6= h0 2R Z⇤q. D continues execution of F , until F produces
another collision forgery of the form hm, r,m0, r00, HK 0i, where gH(m||Y ||Z)(Y Z)r =
gH(m
0||Y ||Z0)(Y Z 0)r” mod q. Given the two collisions produced by F , we now have
h + (y + z)r = h0 + (y + z0)r0 mod q and h0 + (y + z0)r0 = h00 + (y + z0)r00 mod q,
where h is the response D gave when F made the query hm||Y ||Zi to OH , and z0 is
the discrete log of Z 0. From h0 + (y + z0)r0 = h00 + (y + z0)r00 mod q, D computes
tk0 = (h0   h00)(r00   r0) 1 mod q, where tk0 = y + z0. Finally, from h + (y + z)r =
h0+(y+ z0)r0 mod q, D computes the discrete log of Y as y = r 1(h0 h+ tk0r0)  z
mod q. This concludes the proof.
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Theorem 2 The proposed trapdoor hashing scheme, DL-mDTH [cf. subsection 5.3.1],
is key-exposure-resistant.
Proof: Key exposure resistance in DL-mDTH implies that given a trapdoor collision
tuple hm, r,HK,m0, r0, HK 0i such that THHK(m, r) = THHK0(m0, r0), where HK =
(Y, Z) and HK 0 = (Y, Z 0), it is computationally infeasible to find the long-term
trapdoor key, y corresponding to Y .
Assume that there exists a PPT algorithm K that succeeds in key exposure against
DL-mDTH with non-negligible advantage. Given K we can construct a PPT algorithm
D that breaks the subgroup DLP assumption [134] as follows. Similar to the proof
of Theorem 1, D is given a DLP instance hp, q, g, Y i and needs to find y 2 Z⇤q such
that Y = gy mod p. Once again, the hash function H behaves as a random oracle
OH that D simulates.
D chooses z 2R Z⇤q, computes Z = gz mod p, and sets HK = (Y, Z). Next, D
choosesm,m0 2R {0, 1}⇤ and h, h0, r, r0 2R Z⇤q. D computes Z 0 = Y  1(g(h h0)r0 1(Y Z)rr0 1)
mod p and sets H(m||Y ||Z) = h and H(m0||Y ||Z 0) = h0. It is straightforward to see
that hm, r,HK,m0, r0, HK 0i, where HK 0 = (Y, Z 0), is a double-trapdoor collision tu-
ple. D then runs an instance of forger K with hm, r,HK,m0, r0, HK 0i as input. When
K outputs y, D outputs the same value y as the discrete log of Y . This concludes
the proof.
In addition to collision forgery resistance and key exposure resistance, the pro-
posed trapdoor hashing scheme also provides semantic security [129]. A trapdoor
hashing scheme is said to be semantically secure if, for all hash keys HK, and all
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message pairs m and m0, m 6= m0, the probability distributions of the hash values
THHK(m, r) and THHK(m0, r) are computationally indistinguishable. We omit the
proof here as it closely follows the technique of Ateniese et al. [131].
Given that DL-mDTH exhibits properties of collision forgery resistance, key exposure
resistance and semantic security, as well as the provable security guarantees provided
by the well-known DL-Schnorr [160] signature scheme, we state the following:
Theorem 3 The protocol employed for access and exchange of patient health in-
formation is secure against adaptive chosen message attacks in the random oracle
model [162] under the well-known discrete log assumption.
Proof: The proposed authorization protocol is based on a trapdoor hash-based
proxy signature scheme, where the certificate generation phase involves Hc delegating
a patient P as a proxy under warrant mw, and subsequently, the patient generating a
proxy signature  P on mp, where mp complies with the warrant mw. The certificate
verification phase involves verification of P ’s proxy signature (along with verification
of Hc’s signature on the warrant). Given this, we can now prove the security of
the proposed authorization protocol by proving the security of the underlying proxy
signature scheme against forgery.
The security of the trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme is based on the
formal security model by Chandrasekhar et al. [134], which, in turn, is closely related
to the model by Boldyreva et al. [143]. The model involves a multi-party setting,
with several entities (in our case, both patients and HCOs) having (private, public)
key pairs registered with some public authority (in our case, the HIE cloud). The
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adversary has the ability to play the role of any arbitrary entity except a single honest
entity. The adversary achieves this by having the ability to corrupt entities and learn
their private keys or by adding new arbitrary entities and registering their public keys
(for which the corresponding private key need not be known).
The adversary is given access to standard and proxy signing oracles, and can
interact multiple times with the honest entity, playing the role of di↵erent entities
each time. We also assume that the adversary controls all communications. Given
these abilities, the adversary attempts to forge a regular signature (called a type 1
forgery) or a proxy signature of the single honest entity. In case of a forged proxy
signature, the adversary can output a forgery where the honest entity is either playing
the role of a proxy (called a type 2 forgery) or a delegator (called a type 3 forgery).
For a detailed explanation of the formal model, the reader is referred to [134] [143],
where they define the security of a proxy signature scheme against an adaptive chosen
message attack.
Now, given an adversary that succeeds in producing a forged regular or proxy
signature, we can construct an adversary that breaks the well known DL assumption
in the random oracle model (where the hash functions G and H behave as random
oracles). The proof is a straightforward adaptation of that given by Chandrasekhar et
al. [134]. In short, a regular signature (or a type 1) forgery results in a forged Schnorr
signature, which is known to be secure under the DL assumption. A type 2 forgery
results in a trapdoor collision forgery in the DL-mDTH scheme, which showed to be
secure under the DL assumption in Theorem 1. And finally, a type 3 forgery results
in an oracle replay attack that also breaks the DL assumption. Thus, the proposed
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trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme is secure against adaptive chosen mes-
sage attacks in the random oracle model [162] under the well-known DL assumption.
This, in turn, establishes the security of the proposed authorization protocol.
5.5 Evaluation
The access control protocol is built using a trapdoor hash-based proxy signature
scheme. However, we can also use other proxy signature schemes to construct the
protocol. Table 5.1 shows a direct comparison of the costs and properties associ-
ated with the access control protocol using the trapdoor hash-based proxy signa-
ture scheme against using the proxy signature schemes developed by Mambo et al.
(MUO) [141], Kim et al. (KPW) [144], Petersen et al. (PH) [163], Lee et al. (MLKK) [148],
Huang et al. (HSMW) [164] and Zhang et al. (ZNS) [165].
The performance characteristics of the KPW protocol are the same as those of
its provably secure variant by Boldyreva et al. [143] and its proxy non-designated
variant by Lee et al. [145]. The scheme by Lee et al. [145], however, requires a secure
communication channel between the delegator and the proxy. Lee et al. (MLKK) [148]
proposed a variant of the scheme in [145] to overcome this weakness. For the sake
of uniformity in comparison, we consider a security benchmark of 1024 bits — the
system parameters p and q of the proposed scheme, MUO, KPW, MLKK, and PH are 1024-
bit and 160-bit primes, respectively. Also, we assume the employment of the Schnorr
signature for proxy signature generation in the MUO, KPW, PH and MLKK schemes.
As shown in Table 5.1, the computation overhead of the access control protocol
can be divided into the cost of certificate generation and verification, where the cost of
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Table 5.1: Performance Comparison with security benchmark of 1024-bits. e: modular exponentiation, s: scalar multiplica-
tions, p: pairing computation; †: subsequent verification overhead of authorization certificate with cached signed authorization
template, ‡: system parameters require up to 10KB of additional storage [3], ⇤: excluding the size of warrant and message
MUO PH MLKK ZNS KPW HSMW Proposed
Certificate Generation 4e 5e 5e 4s+ 2p 4e 8s+ 2p 7e
Subsequent Certificate Generation 1e 1e 1e 2s 1e 5s 1e
Certificate Verification 4e 3e 4e 1s+ 2p 4e(2e†) 5p 5e(2e†)
Public Key Size (bits) 2048 1532 2048 1532‡ 2048
Certificate Size (bits)⇤ 1344 1504 160 1344 480 640
Secure Channel Y N N N N N N
Provably Secure N N N N Y Y Y
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certificate generation includes the operations necessary to generate the signed autho-
rization template by the HCO. The subsequent certificate generation cost in Table 5.1
corresponds to the case where a patient stores the signed authorization template to
save the cost of re-verifying the delegating HCO’s signature on the warrant. We ob-
serve that the access control protocol using the trapdoor hash-based proxy signature
scheme achieves the best overall e ciency when compared to using other well-known
proxy signature schemes for subsequent certificate generation and verification. More
specifically, the protocol is as e cient as the most e cient proxy signature scheme,
KPW, and is 33% more e cient compared to the next most e cient proxy signature
scheme, PH (which is not provably secure). Although the certificate generation process
is expensive in the proposed scheme, we argue that this step would not be performed
often, and the majority of computational overhead would stem from any subsequent
certificate generation and verification. Moreover, the cost of certificate generation
is split between the HCO and patient, where the patient only incurs 4 (of the total
7) exponentiations. The HSMW and ZNS schemes use considerably more expensive bi-
linear pairing operations in the delegation and proxy signature verification phases.
For instance, the cost of computing a single pairing can equal approximately 11110
multiplications in Zq, where q is a 171-bit prime (for security benchmark of 1024-
bits) [166], which is significantly higher than the cost of exponentiations with 160-bit
exponents.
Critiquing the access control protocol, we observe that it can also be built using
sanitizable signature schemes [136] [137]. However, sanitizable signature schemes are
built to achieve significantly di↵erent security properties than what is required for the
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proposed authorization protocol. More specifically, sanitizable signature schemes are
designed to allow a designated entity, called a sanitizer, to modify parts of a message
while maintaining privacy (sanitized message does not reveal anything about the
original data) and transparency (not being able to determine whether a message hash
has been sanitized), among other properties [137]. Also, the property of transparency
of sanitizable signatures leads to increased complexity, and a linear increase in the
overhead for computing the sanitized signature. Thus, we conclude that sanitizable
signatures are unsuitable for constructing the proposed authorization protocol.
For the proposed scheme, MUO, KPW, MLKK and PH, the size of the long-term public
key, excluding shared components (primes p and q), equals 2048-bits. The pairing-
based schemes, HSMW and ZNS, use public keys of size 1532-bits. The proposed scheme
also produces the smallest proxy signatures compared to MUO, KPW, PH and MLKK.
Even though the HSMW and ZNS schemes produce smaller signatures, they su↵er from
significantly higher computational overhead, as mentioned earlier. Thus, the pro-
posed authorization protocol using our trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme
achieves the best overall performance compared to other proxy signature schemes in
the literature, while being provably secure.
Copyright c  Ahmed Fouad Shedeed Ibrahim, 2016.
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Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusions
Patients’ health records should follow them wherever and whenever needed, despite
barriers that may occur due to the involvement of multiple facilities or di↵erent geo-
graphic areas. Thus, HIE governance should be done through e↵ective collaboration
between entities while considering implementation and security costs. HIE should be
done with regards to privacy policies, strictly limiting the access to patients records
in order to prevent any outsiders from gaining unauthorized access to the system.
The information should be exchanged among entities while maintaining confidential-
ity and without leaking out of the system, which may occur because of the faults of
the system itself or liability issues. Attackers aim to exploit the patients’ records in
the healthcare and medical sectors since the records contain very critical data. The
value of medical records is sustained compared to other documents. When designing
HIE systems, authentication, authorization, privacy, confidentiality, integrity, and
auditability must be maintained.
The protocol discussed in Chapter 4 provides HCOs with mutual authentica-
tion, patient identification, patient authentication, patient consent, and symmetric
key generation. The protocol mutually authenticates communication parties before
preparing the patient’s EHR for exchange. The interaction between communicating
parties during authentication a rms the identities of the parties involved in the pro-
cess. Additionally, the protocol authenticates the patient to its home HCO using
the patient’s assigned username and the stored hash of the patient’s password. The
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password supplied by the patient is used to compute the hash and is never stored by
New.
To ensure the confidentiality of the health information during transmission, the
symmetric key KCons is used for encryption. The symmetric key KCons is computed us-
ing the hash of the patient’s password (PH(password)current ) and Current’s nonce (NCurrent),
which is randomly generated by Current for each communication session. The use
of the hash of the patient’s password as a part of the consent key ensures that New
will not be able to generate the correct session key without the consent of the patient
implied by having the patient enter his/her password at New. The use of fresh nonce
by Current ensures the generation of a new symmetric consent key for each session
and avoids the reuse of older keys. The symmetric key KCons is simultaneously gen-
erated by Current and New and is never exchanged. Thus, it is impossible for an
adversary to find a key (KCons) that can compromise the confidentiality of the health
information exchanged.
Patients are given the ability to authorize the retrieval of only a certain category
(type) of medical information. Patients’ requested health information is prepared in
four simple steps. Requested health information is encrypted using a symmetric key
generated simultaneously at the involved healthcare organizations and reveals nothing
about the content of the message. The protocol does not link patients’ identity to
their health information during the transmission of the exchanged health information.
The integrity of the requested health information is checked to detect any possible
alteration or distortion of information. The Audit System (AS) maintains adequate
information for all incoming and outgoing exchange requests which allows auditing
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at any time.
The privacy protocol presented in Chapter 4 is simple, secure, and does not re-
quire the usage of any special hardware or smart cards by the patient, whereas [52]
requires the usage of temper-resistant and specially designed hardware to interact
with high density SmartCards. The privacy protocol uses only three message ex-
changes for authentication and one message exchange to retrieve the health infor-
mation, whereas [54] uses a total of nine message exchanges to retrieve the health
information.
We conducted security analysis of the protocol which demonstrated that our pro-
tocol meets the security standards defined in the technical safeguards of the HIPAA
security rule, whereas other protocol, such as [55] and [57], do not provide adequate
security analysis for their proposals. We showed that our protocol maintains the
transmission security, access control, integrity, and audit requirements of the HIPAA
security rule. Also, the protocol prevents man-in-the-middle attacks and detect replay
messages. In summary, the proposed protocol maintains authentication, authoriza-
tion, privacy, confidentiality, integrity, and auditability.
In Chapter 5, a novel discrete log-based trapdoor hashing scheme that is e cient
and secure against collision forgery and key-exposure was developed. Then, a novel
proxy signature-based access control protocol for cloud based HIE was presented. The
access control protocol allows patients to interact with their current HCOs in order to
obtain an authorization template. The authorization template provides the patient
with a standard signature on the trapdoor hash of a space descriptor (warrant).
Patients can then create authorization certificates to allow other HCOs to access their
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records from the HIE-cloud. This is done by generating a trapdoor collision between
the warrant and the specific authorization parameters that specify the new HCO that
needs to be granted access to patient data, the validity period of the authorization,
and the types of records that can be accessed. After generating an authorization
certificate AC for an HCO Hn, the patient can store the authorization template
AT to grant authorizations to other HCOs, or modify existing authorizations for a
previously authorized HCO. The patient generates subsequent (or modifies existing)
authorization certificates simply by creating new authorization parameters m0p and
computing a trapdoor hash collision withmw. The patient need not re-verify  , which
provides significant savings in computational costs.
The HIE-cloud can verify authorization certificates using public keys of the patient
and original HCO. The access control protocol ensures that such authorizations are
authentic with respect to both the original HCO and the patient granting access.
In addition, the protocol allows patients to authorize the sharing of specific medical
information with specific HCOs, which helps prevent any undesired or unintentional
leakage of health information. Just as a patient can re-use a signed authorization
template to save on computation, the HIE cloud can also save the signed authorization
template and avoid the cost of re-verifying Hc’s signature on the warrant. Every time
the HIE cloud receives a new authorization certificate A0C generated by the same
combination of Hc and P , the HIE cloud can simply compare the t and h parameters
in A0C with those in the previously received AC to verify the collision between trapdoor
hashes of the warrant and the new authorization parameters.
The presented access control protocol achieves the best overall e ciency when
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compared to other well-known proxy signature schemes for certificate generation (AT
and AC), subsequent certificate generation (AC only), and certificate verification.
More specifically, the proposed scheme is as e cient as the most e cient proxy sig-
nature scheme, KPW, and is 33% more e cient than the next most e cient proxy
signature scheme, PH (which is not provably secure). Although the certificate genera-
tion process is expensive in the proposed scheme, we argue that this step would not be
performed often, and the majority of computational overhead would stem from any
subsequent certificate generation and verification. Moreover, the cost of certificate
generation is split between the HCO and patient, where the patient only incurs 4 (of
the total 7) exponentiations. Finally, the proposed authorization protocol using our
trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme achieves the best overall performance
compared to other proxy signature schemes in the literature, while being provably
secure.
Copyright c  Ahmed Fouad Shedeed Ibrahim, 2016.
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